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ABSTRACT  
 
Parting company with much of the existing literature that examines White attitudes toward 
punitive social policies perceived to target Black Americans, this dissertation explores the 
conditions under which Blacks are willing to support these same policies. Bringing to bear 
insights from multiple disciplines, the dissertation examines the role that respectability—or a 
concern about in-group behavior and comportment—plays in affecting Black Americans’ 
willingness to support policies that have adverse consequences for members of their racial group. 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the dissertation and sets up the motivating puzzle that 
guides the remainder of the project. In Chapter 2, I more carefully define the politics of 
respectability and situate this work alongside existing scholarship in history, psychology, and 
political science. In this chapter, I also outline the theoretical framework that links the politics of 
respectability to punitiveness. In Chapter 3, I introduce a measure of respectability, the 
Respectability Politics Scale, and examine the distribution of the measure and its demographic, 
social, and psychological correlates. In Chapter 4, I examine the degree to which the 
Respectability Politics Scale provides explanatory leverage above and beyond existing 
constructs. Results indicate that respectability, as captured by the RPS, is strongly associated 
with Black attitudes toward a range of punitive outcomes, though results also suggest a need to 
further refine the measure developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 leverages a study conducted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk that varies the racial identity of teenagers who create a disturbance 
in a movie theater. Analyses from this study help further inform our thinking about the role that 
emotional and instrumental consideration play in affecting individuals’ support for punishment 
that implicates members of the group. I find, for example, that Black respondents’ perceptions of 
costs for people like the teenagers corresponds with punishment when the teenagers are Black, 
but not when the teenagers are described as White. In the final chapter, I conclude by 
highlighting the findings of the dissertation and remarking on the importance of this work for 
advancing our understanding of the role of identity in our thinking about American politics and 
the politics of punishment, in particular. 
  1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In a 5-1 vote of its town council on July 5, 2016, Timmonsville, South Carolina—a 
majority Black town with a majority Black town council and a Black mayor—became the latest 
among several local municipalities across the country to pass an ordinance regulating the public 
presentation and dress of its residents. Alongside provisions prohibiting public nudity and the 
public sharing of pornographic material, provision D of Ordinance No. 543 made it illegal to 
“wear pants, trousers, or shorts such that the known undergarments are intentionally 
displayed/exposed to the public.” Although perhaps humorous on its face, this provision was 
backed by the full force of the law and the threat of financial and legal sanctions. Per the 
guidelines set forth in the ordinance, those violating any of its provisions would first receive an 
official warning. Repeat offenders would face a fine between $100 and $600.1  
The American Civil Liberties Union and other groups have derided so-called “sagging 
pants bans” as unnecessary and discriminatory, alleging that they target “a clothing style 
typically associated with young African-American males.”2 Despite these criticisms, however, 
ordinances like the one passed in this small South Carolina town remain in municipal codes in 
towns and cities across the United States. And though they raise the ire of those worried about 
the disparate impact such regulations will have on the lives of Black Americans, they are 
implemented and maintained by a diverse array of supporters, including many from the 
community that stands to be most affected by their enforcement. 
                                                        
1 https://www.nbc26.com/news/national/timmonsville-south-carolina-outlaws-sagging-pants 
2 https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-reminds-iberville-parish-clothing-protected-expression 
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In fact, Black Americans have often adopted policy positions seemingly at odds with the 
interests of those who belong to their racial group. When President Bill Clinton signed into law 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, he did so with widespread Black 
support, even as the law promised to expand the federal death penalty and impose harsher 
penalties for a range of crimes that would disproportionately affect Black offenders.3 And when 
he ushered in restrictive welfare reform policies, promising to “end welfare as we know it,” he 
did so with Black people at his side—both literally and metaphorically—despite the clear 
message that “reform” largely meant curtailing benefits for the Black poor who were perceived 
as taking advantage of welfare policies (Gilens 1999). And in recent texts by Michael Fortner 
(2015) and James Forman, Jr. (2017), we are reminded that Black support for racialized punitive 
social policies, including support for harsh drug sentencing and tough-on-crime policies, 
predates and persists beyond the period of the 1990s and the tenure of a popular Democratic 
president. Without overstating the case, one cannot (or at least should not) consider America’s 
“system of racial and social control” without acknowledging the complexities of the Black 
attitudes that are both the product of, and help to maintain, such a system.4   
 Students of American politics do not need convincing that social identities matter in the 
structuring of attitudes toward various social policies. In particular, the canon is quite impressive 
in delineating the various factors that influence White public opinion regarding racialized 
punitive social policies. We know, for example, that many White Americans come to support 
harsh crime policies because of their negative attitudes toward Black people—the group they 
                                                        
3 According to data from the 1994 American National Election Study, 70 percent of Black 
respondents (n=202) reported that they favored the Clinton crime bill passed into law by the 
Congress.  
4 For a more in-depth analysis of America’s “system of racial and social control,” see Michelle 
Alexander’s (2010) The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.  
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perceive will be appropriately and deservingly targeted by these policies’ implementation (e.g. 
Alexander 2012; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008; Weaver 2007). 
In the domain of redistributive policies, we know, too, that White support for restricting welfare 
benefits is predicated, at least in part, on a belief that the chief beneficiaries of a robust welfare 
system are the undeserving Black poor who sit around waiting on government checks that they 
will ultimately spend irresponsibly (e.g. H. E. Brown 2013; Gilens 1995, 1999; Hancock 2004). 
But when it comes to making sense of Black support for the same punitive policies that 
bear disproportionately on members of their community, much of the scholarship on race and 
politics has seemingly adopted one of two positions. Scholars have decided, either that there is 
not much worth examining with respect to Black attitudes in this domain or that the theoretical 
and analytical frameworks used to examine White public opinion are sufficient to examine the 
opinions of those whose identities are most intimately connected to the policies we examine. 
Regarding the first point, let me assure the reader that the near uniformity of Black people’s 
partisan and electoral choices belies the undeniable diversity within Black public opinion. The 
second point – that theoretical models designed for White Americans necessarily apply equally 
well to African Americans – is a more challenging point to engage and one I will return to in the 
next chapter where I lay out the theoretical argument of the dissertation in full. Nevertheless, let 
me indicate here that identities are complicated, messy things. It seems odd, both from a practical 
and theoretical standpoint, to expect that the immigrant’s attitudes about immigration have the 
same structure as one whose identity is not at all implicated in our thinking about the issue.5 And 
                                                        
5 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that Whiteness and White identity are not bound up in 
considerations of immigration (Jardina 2014). I intend, instead, to point out that the perceived 
targets of social policies likely have a different mix of factors that contribute to their public 
opinion, relative to those who are not in the target population. 
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so it likely is with respect to the racialized punitive policies that motivate this dissertation. It 
seems at least plausible that Black people come to think about punishment that implicates 
members of their social group with slightly different considerations than Whites, who see these 
policies as ones that largely target “those people over there.” The goal of this dissertation is to 
investigate this possibility. 
That there is a penchant for punishment among some Black Americans ought not surprise 
us. Black elites have, for some time, endorsed the notion that members of the Black community 
should police their own and hold them to exacting standards of behavior. Before his fall from 
grace, comedian and actor Bill Cosby was invited to provide the keynote address at an event 
commemorating the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. The tenor and tone of the 
speech was instructive. “It’s not what they’re doing to us. It’s what we’re not doing.” Cosby told 
the mostly Black audience.6 Citing high school dropout rates, incidences of teen pregnancy, 
missing Black fathers, and high levels of crime in predominantly Black cities – at levels that 
were likely exaggerated - Cosby argued that individual-level failings, rather than systemic or 
structural inequality, were primarily responsible for the status of life in contemporary Black 
America.7  
                                                        
6 A complete transcript of the speech can be found at 
https://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~schochet/101/Cosby_Speech.htm.   
7 In what would become the most famous part of Cosby’s address, he scolded black people for 
being too sympathetic toward some within the community who were undeserving of their 
sympathy and deserving of reprimand instead. The speech would become known as the “Pound 
Cake Speech for this bit: “Looking at the incarcerated, these are not political criminals. These are 
people going around stealing Coca-Cola. People getting shot in the back of the head over a piece 
of pound cake! And then we all run out and are outraged. ‘The cops shouldn’t have shot him.’ 
What the hell was he doing with the pound cake in his hand?”  
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Don Lemon, a prominent Black host on CNN, sounded the same alarm following the 
shooting death of Trayvon Martin and the subsequent acquittal of George Zimmerman, the man 
responsible for his death. In a segment of his show called “No Talking Points,” Lemon 
encouraged Black people to “clean up your act,” arguing that Black people’s lives would be 
made better if they did five things: pulled up their pants, stopped using the n-word, respected 
where they lived, finished school, and took family planning seriously. Pleading with his 
audience, he closed the segment with the following statement: 
 
Pay attention to and think about what has been presented in recent history as acceptable 
behavior. Pay close attention to the hip-hop and rap culture that many of you embrace. A 
culture that glorifies everything I just mentioned, thug and reprehensible behavior, a 
culture that is making a lot of people rich, just not you. And it’s not going to.8 
 
Lemon and Cosby are not alone in turning their attention to the perceived behavioral 
shortcomings of Blacks as the principal explanation for racial inequality. In a commencement 
address to the graduating class of Morehouse College, a historically Black institution in Atlanta, 
Georgia, President Barack Obama adopted a similar tone with his audience, remarking, “We 
know that too many young men in our community continue to make bad choices.”9 
The focus on Black behavior as a key component in understanding the condition of Black 
people in the U.S. was a consistent theme in speeches by Obama before Black audiences during 
his campaign for the presidency and throughout his tenure in the White House (Harris 2012). If 
Black people wanted better lives, Obama often argued, they needed to work harder, eat and 
                                                        
8 It is unclear whether Lemon would make these statements today. He has become, as the kids 
say, more woke in recent years. 
9 A complete transcript of the speech can be found at 
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/05/20/transcript-obamas- commencement-speech-at-
morehouse-college/. 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parent better, invest more time and energy in education, and behave in ways that would lead to 
greater success for themselves and their communities.10  And despite criticisms from some 
members of the Black intelligentsia that these admonishments were irresponsible and out of 
touch with the history of racial inequality in the United States, those attending these addresses 
signaled their agreement throughout, often interrupting the president with applause and laughter.  
Why, one might wonder, would Black Americans so consistently support policies that 
threaten to criminalize and punish members of their own community? For example, why do 
nearly 40 percent of Black Americans support the death penalty, despite the disproportionate 
effects it has on Black lives? How do we understand Black support for restrictive welfare 
policies, despite the clarity with which Black women, in particular, are cast as targets? And in 
contexts big and small, how do we understand motivations to hold in-group members to account? 
I argue that at least one of the answers to these questions lies in the general receptivity to the 
kinds of messages espoused publicly by Black elites and privately by many others—messages 
that highlight, critique, and attempt to correct the behavior of in-group members. Referred to as 
the politics of respectability, this collection of in-group directed concerns about behavior and 
comportment is familiar to many within and outside the academy, but to date has not been 
subjected to a rigorous, systematic treatment by social scientists, leaving open the question of 
whether, and to what extent, respectability matters in structuring Black public opinion. And 
before we can even begin to answer this important question, we must think critically about a set 
of first-order questions that examine both the roots and reach of respectability within the Black 
                                                        
10 It can be argued that a similar investment in the individual-level behavior as a determinant of 
outcomes motivated Obama to establish his My Brother’s Keeper initiative, which has as a key 
feature a mentorship program that pairs minority youth with mentors to help them “stay on 
track.” 
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community. These are not, as I see them, questions that can be left solely to our friends in history 
and sociology, but are ones that must be considered by those of us interested in both the social 
and psychological components and manifestations of identity.  
Respectability, as I will argue throughout, provides an opportunity to think about 
dynamics within stigmatized social groups that are too often sidelined or ignored in our 
examination of group members’ attitudes and behaviors. In thinking carefully about why 
individuals may come to embrace the politics of respectability or feel motivated to punish in-
group members, we are forced to consider a range of self-directed and group-based emotions like 
shame and embarrassment that may manifest as a function of one’s fellow group member’s 
behavior. To date, few political scientists have considered the role these emotions play in 
affecting political outcomes. And though there is a robust dialogue in comparative politics about 
in-group policing as a response to instrumental concerns pertaining to group status (see Fearon 
and Laitin 1996, for example), much less attention has been paid to these dynamics in the 
American politics canon, though members of stigmatized groups in the U.S. face similar 
concerns that group members’ behaviors may pose a threat to the status or goals of the group. 
Here, I will focus my attention on Black people and the politics of respectability, but in doing so, 
hope to lay the foundation for thinking about how these concerns about behavior and 
comportment take hold in other stigmatized groups. Moreover, the theoretical work of the 
dissertation that investigates the roots of respectability and respectability’s connection to 
punitive social policies provides a framework for thinking anew about identity and the varied, 
and sometimes nuanced, ways that identity matters in American politics and beyond.  
The dissertation proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2 of Policing Norms, I discuss the 
existing literature as it pertains to respectability politics and in-group policing. Building on the 
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work of historians and social scientists, this chapter serves a critical role in helping clarify 
precisely what is meant by the politics of respectability and how we might consider it more 
broadly as a form of in-group policing that may extend beyond Black Americans. More than 
providing definitional clarity, Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical case for connecting the politics 
of respectability to punitive attitudes. Though this chapter is not intended to provide a full read 
of the historical record as it relates to the respectability, I engage with some of the pioneering 
work on the topic and build a theory of respectability that considers the psychological and 
instrumental considerations that may give rise to in-group policing among Blacks and those who 
belong to other stigmatized social groups.  
Following this theoretical setup, Chapter 3 introduces the first measure of respectability, 
the Respectability Politics Scale (RPS), which affords us a level of empirical rigor currently 
absent in discussions of respectability’s role in structuring the politics of Black Americans. Here, 
I discuss the measurement strategy used and walk the reader through my operationalization of 
the concept. The introduction of this novel measure provides us the first opportunity to examine 
the prevalence of respectability among Black Americans and to assess its demographic, social, 
and psychological correlates. Regarding the distribution of the measure, I find that a significant 
portion of Black Americans embrace the politics of respectability and that the measure 
corresponds with, but is distinct from, concepts like authoritarianism. 
Chapter 4 examines the degree to which respectability corresponds with Black attitudes 
toward punitive social policies. Using a diverse national sample of Black Americans recruited by 
YouGov, the analyses presented here provide us the first evidence of a strong connection 
between respectability and Black attitudes toward a range of social policies—from support for 
sagging pants bans to support for restrictive policies that police the behavior of welfare 
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recipients. As further evidence of the unique role respectability plays in affecting Black public 
opinion toward these issues, the RPS maintains its predictive power, even alongside measures of 
authoritarianism, linked fate, identity centrality, and other more familiar constructs. I conclude 
this chapter with a discussion of additional findings that test the scope conditions of 
respectability, as measured by the RPS.  
Chapter 5 of the dissertation presents the results of a recent study conducted that 
examines more carefully the considerations associated with in-group punishment versus out-
group punishment among Black Americans. Using a novel survey experiment, I explore the 
influence of psychological and instrumental considerations on individuals’ willingness to punish 
in-group members versus out-group members. Findings presented here and in the previous 
chapter help to further clarify the roots of in-group policing and the contextual factors that 
condition individuals’ propensity to punish members of their social group. 
I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications of this work for our thinking 
about identity and politics more broadly. That is, what do we learn about the role of identity in 
American politics by focusing so squarely on Black people’s willingness to act punitively toward 
in-group members? More than finalizing the discussion about respectability as a useful 
theoretical concept with interesting theoretical foundations, I spend some time discussing what 
this work means for our thinking about America’s system of racial and social control. And by 
centering Black people in the study of punitive social policies in the U.S., this dissertation makes 
a significant contribution to scholarship across disciplines and subfields interested in better 
understanding the challenges and opportunities for reform in the criminal justice system and in 
other policy areas discussed herein. At base, the argument to which I will return throughout can 
be summarized in the following way: to understand the politics of punishment in the United 
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States, we must understand the politics of those who, in some ways, are most like, not just 
farthest away from, the punished.  The aim of this dissertation is to do just that.  
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Chapter 2: On Respectability 
 
I am not sure when it was that I first heard the word respectability or the phrase the 
politics of respectability, but having spent much of my upbringing in majority Black spaces, the 
elements of respectability were all around me. There were, my friends and I were told, 
appropriate and inappropriate ways to behave, better and worse ways to carry oneself, well-
defined lines that we should not cross, under any circumstances. The insistence on proper 
behavior and comportment was not simply a matter of instruction—the result of some 
prudishness that was especially localized in my neighborhood, at my church, or in my home. 
This seemingly ever-present concern about behavior appeared connected to where Black folks 
found themselves on the social hierarchy, related to a history of subjugation and stigmatization 
and a sense among many members of the group that consequences for “bad” behavior were not 
simply meted out to individual Black people, but had implications for the whole. In listening to 
Black people around me talk about politics at the dinner table, in my neighborhood, and in 
family gatherings, I developed the distinct impression that the tenets of respectability were ever-
present in individuals’ thinking about punishment, particularly when that punishment was 
perceived to implicate other Black people. In this chapter, I want to begin by situating the current 
project in the existing literature before laying out more formally a theoretical framework that 
connects the politics of respectability to attitudes about punishment among Black Americans. To 
start, I discuss some of the foundational work on respectability that inspires this dissertation and 
forms the foundation for much of the theoretical and empirical work detailed herein.  
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The politics of respectability was first introduced into our scholarly lexicon by historian 
Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham in her seminal work, Righteous Discontent: The Women’s 
Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880-1920. Describing the role Black women played in 
the struggle for racial equality, Higginbotham characterizes the politics of respectability as a 
strategy employed to challenge the subordinate position Blacks occupied throughout much of the 
United States. As it related to the Black Baptist women’s movement, Higginbotham notes that 
“the politics of respectability emphasized reform of individual behavior and attitudes both as a 
goal in itself and as strategy for reform of the entire structural system of American race 
relations” (1993, 187). 
Those who adhered to the politics of respectability thought it important for group 
members “to counter racist images and structures” by adhering to “dominant society’s norms of 
manners and morals” (Higginbotham 1993, 187), believing that if group members behaved 
better, they would be treated better by society. The politics of respectability, Higginbotham 
argues, did not eschew or ignore political aims, nor did it give in to a system of racial inequality 
and White supremacy. To the contrary, the politics of respectability was inherently political, 
providing adherents with what they believed to be a reliable opportunity to upend the racial order 
of the day. 
Functioning in this way, the politics of respectability guided the thinking of women in the 
Black Baptist Church who insisted that other African-Americans behave in ways that would 
show them to be morally superior to Whites. Instead of responding angrily to insults from White 
Americans, for example, adherents of respectability insisted that other Blacks engage civilly. 
Such civil responses, they argued, would go a long way in countering negative portrayals of 
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Blacks often used to justify their subordination. Respectability, therefore, served as a kind of 
ideological positioning among some members of the Black community, centering the problem of  
racial inequality not simply in the hearts, minds, and systems of White America, but in the 
behaviors and predilections of Blacks. As such, the politics of respectability encouraged a view 
of the social world that saw the fate of Black people as being determined as much by their own 
behavior and comportment as by implicit or explicit discrimination from Whites. Moreover, we 
see in this description of respectability a sort of quid pro quo understanding of racial 
inequality—a sense that Blacks could persuade Whites to treat Black people better if Blacks 
behaved better, thus showing themselves worthy of equal treatment. 
Working alongside this insistence on “respectable” behavior that valued “temperance, 
cleanliness of person and property, thrift, polite manners, and sexual purity” was a profound 
belief in self-help and the idea that Black workers, even and perhaps especially domestic 
workers, needed to be professionalized. Given the frequency with which these workers engaged 
White Americans, it was thought that they had as much an opportunity as any to influence the 
group’s image, and thus, needed to take extra care to carry themselves in a manner that was in 
keeping with the tenets of respectability. To train these workers in the ways of respectability, 
Nannie Helen Burroughs, working with the staff of the National Baptist Convention, founded 
The National Training School for Women and Girls. Describing the experience at the school, 
Higginbotham notes the following: 
At six o’clock each morning students were inspected for personal cleanliness and 
neatness. They were ranked as critically on appearance and deportment as on course 
work, with attention being paid to body odor, hair, and clothing (1993, 216). 
 
If a worker excelled in coursework at the school but did not live up to the standards set forth by 
the politics of respectability, she failed, for she was not simply being trained to be a better 
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domestic worker; she was being trained to be a model representative of the racial group. Her job 
was not simply to carry out domestic duties well. She was tasked with advancing the interests of 
the group by showing herself and, by proxy, other Blacks to be worthy of such advancement. 
When she failed on this score, she was punished, not only by the Whites for whom she worked, 
but by members of the group who insisted that she be a respectable Negro whose behavior would 
reflect positively on her, and perhaps equally important, reflect positively on the group as a 
whole. 
This insistence on proper behavior and comportment evident in the politics of Black 
America throughout the 19th and 20th centuries featured prominently in the speeches and writings 
of many Black elites, including Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois who, despite 
disagreeing often, were united in their belief in the power of respectability to transform the lives 
of Black Americans (Gaines 2012; Harris 2012). Beyond these examples, we see the apparent 
influence of respectability across other periods of American history. Describing iconic 
photographs of Rosa Parks disseminated during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Fackler (2016) 
reminds readers of civil rights leaders’ reliance on the politics of respectability to advance their 
claims of equal treatment under the law. Parks was not, after all, the first woman to refuse to give 
up her seat to a White passenger. Other young women, including Claudette Colvin and Mary 
Louis Smith, had also refused requests to give up their seats in protest of the city’s 
discriminatory practice. Colvin and Smith, however, “did not fulfill the strict requirements of 
bourgeois respectability: Colvin was unmarried and allegedly pregnant and Smith’s home 
supposedly was not neat and her father not sober enough” (Fackler 2016, 273). This centering of 
respectability in the Civil Rights Movement, though perhaps advantageous to the Movement’s 
overall goals, Fackler argues, further sidelined more stigmatized members of the group, 
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projecting an image of the community that failed to accurately reflect the complexity and 
humanity of the whole. 
This concern about the power of respectability to forestall progress for certain members 
of the group is also central to arguments put forth in Cohen’s (1999) Boundaries of Blackness, 
which considers the question of why, despite its disproportionate effect on Blacks, the AIDS 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s failed to mobilize the whole of the Black community. Though 
Cohen’s theoretical work centers primarily on power relations among different members of the 
racial group, the framework she adopts is keenly aware of the potential for the politics of 
respectability to affect individuals’ willingness to engage on behalf of more stigmatized group 
members. Discussing coverage of the AIDS crisis in Black newspapers and magazines, Cohen 
outlines three guiding principles underlying coverage of the crisis in these outlets, two of which 
are pertinent to the discussion here. First, there was “an extreme effort to portray the positive or 
mainstream characteristics of Black communities” and secondly, there existed “a social and 
conservative moralism with regard to behaviors seen as bringing shame or negating legitimate 
claims for equality and respect by most African Americans” (1999, 197–98). In other work, 
Cohen (1997) and other feminist and queer theorists (White 2001) remain critical of this 
insistence on good behavior, worrying that it undermines progress for the most vulnerable 
members of the group, thereby contributing to intragroup inequality.1112 
                                                        
11 White is particularly concerned with the ways that respectability restricts our considerations of 
the intersecting nature of various identities. For example, she, like Cohen, worries that 
respectability forecloses an engagement with the unique set of barriers faced by Black queer 
people. Because these Black people are perceived to have transgressed sets of norms, they are 
not included in the stories Black people tell about the racial group and the complexities of their 
experiences go underappreciated by other members of the group.  
12 Taking a slightly different analytic approach, Strolovitch finds that more marginalized 
members of social groups are sidelined in the provision of resources from various advocacy 
groups.  
  16 
Consistent with this argument, Harris (2012, 2014), too, takes a critical view of Barack 
Obama’s reliance on the rhetoric of respectability and what it portends for the future of Black 
politics in an era of increased economic stagnation for Black Americans. The politics of 
respectability, Harris argues, adopts a neo-liberal perspective that shifts the blame from what 
Brown and Young (2016) call “ratchet institutions” to “ratchet” behavior. These institutions, as 
these scholars describe them, oppress and burden Black lives, but are absolved from 
responsibility as Black elites and other members of the Black community attend to and attempt 
to correct what they perceive to be behavioral deficiencies among other group members.13 
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, respectability represents “a dominant 
framework” for understanding how Black Americans evaluate the behavior of other group 
members (C. J. Cohen 2004). As Cohen rightly notes, any careful reading of scholarship focused 
on the politics of Black Americans uncovers discussions of respectability’s role in “policing, 
sanitizing, and hiding the nonconformist and some would argue deviant behavior of certain 
members of African-American communities” (2004, 31). But despite, or perhaps because of, the 
perceived centrality of respectability in discussions of Black political and social life, scholars 
have yet to subject the concept to the kind of scientific scrutiny and scientific debate it deserves. 
To date, the politics of respectability has largely been treated as some underlying feature of 
Black politics—as so deeply engrained in the fabric of Black society, its effects so obvious, that 
systematic investigation is unnecessary.  
                                                        
13 Though not a central focus of this dissertation project, it is important to consider that the 
politics of respectability may intersect with and exacerbate a reliance on neo-liberal principles 
focused on self-reliance and individual self-help that often run counter to the collective goals of 
marginalized groups (Spence 2015). 
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To be sure, we learn a great deal from the work discussed so far in this chapter. In fact, I 
view the current project as building on the existing scholarship on respectability in such diverse 
fields as history, sociology, Black politics, and feminist studies. This project, however, adopts a 
somewhat different approach to the study of respectability and in-group policing. As I laid out in 
the previous chapter, I am concerned here not simply with the history of respectability, but with 
the way respectability works in the minds of individual Blacks. More specifically, this 
dissertation will investigate the psychological and social concerns that make some individuals 
more likely than others to engage in the kind of in-group policing respectability inspires. And 
importantly, this project seeks to understand and measure the implications of respectability for 
the maintenance of social policies that directly bear on the lives of marginalized communities. 
By rigorously engaging the foundations of respectability, this dissertation provides us a 
unique opportunity to think about the sanctioning and policing of behavior within social groups 
more broadly. In this sense, the politics of respectability serves as both the appetizer and the 
main course. For those reading this to understand more fully the influence of respectability on 
the distribution of punitive attitudes within Black America, this dissertation has much to offer. If, 
however, one is less interested in the politics of Black Americans but is interested in the social 
and psychological foundations and likely consequences of in-group policing among those who 
belong to other stigmatized groups, there is much in the pages that follow that will resonate as 
well. Building more complete theoretical and analytical models of the social and political world 
means taking seriously the various features of individuals’ lives that might give rise to the 
choices they make. And given the group-centric nature of our politics (see Brader, Valentino, 
and Suhay 2008; Huddy 2003; Nelson and Kinder 1996), it is only fitting that our discussion of 
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respectability and in-group policing among Blacks begin where it naturally should: the group and 
group identity itself.  
Social Identity Theory and the Emotional Substrates of Respectability 
 
As Tajfel and Turner note in their seminal work on social identity theory, social identities 
“provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms [and] are to a very 
large extent relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, 
as “better” or “worse” than, members of other groups” (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40). Social 
identities, therefore, give us a sense of who we are and what our value is in the social world. To 
build an understanding of the politics of respectability consistent with this framework, let us first 
acknowledge that the category Black represents a salient social identity from which individuals 
derive some sense of who they are. That is, Blacks’ sense of self-worth and self-esteem are 
inextricably linked to their sense of belonging to this social group. As such, individuals are 
motivated to maintain a positive image of the group. The idea here is a simple one: when the 
group’s identity is devalued, the individual’s own sense of self may also be called into question. 
In thinking about stigmatized social groups, such as African Americans, it is even more 
important to consider how individuals navigate these threats to their social identities, given the 
frequency with which members of such groups are forced to encounter negative beliefs, images, 
and thoughts about their social identities. In fact, psychologists Brenda Major and Laurie 
O’Brien (2005), in a review piece on “the psychology of stigma,” note the importance of 
thinking about “identity threat processes” as one of four key ways that “stigma affects the 
stigmatized” (pg. 396). In thinking about the way that stigmatized people interact within the 
social world, the authors write that we must consider “the extent to which stigma’s effects are 
mediated through [individuals’] understanding of how others view them, their interpretations of 
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social contexts, and their motives and goals [in that particular context]” (pg. 397). Relatedly, and 
consistent with the pillars of social identity theory that emphasize self-protective goals, Major 
and Obrien note that these concerns mostly manifest as “self-relevant motives (e.g. self-esteem 
protection)” and that these motives “shape [individuals’] emotions, beliefs and behavior” (pg. 
397). To study stigmatized people, these authors argue, is to concern oneself with how 
individuals respond to instances in which the relevant identity is put under threat. 
The concept of threat is not a novel concept for political scientists. Much of our thinking 
about threat to date, however, focuses on individuals’ responses to perceived status or material 
threats brought about by those who fall outside one’s social group. In this body of work, threat is 
virtually synonymous with competition, as in Bobo and Hutchings’ (1996) examination of the 
effect of perceived group competition for material recourses on the racial attitudes of individuals 
in Los Angeles. Consistent with this conceptualization of threat, other work in the social sciences 
has considered the threatening nature of changing demographics on White racial attitudes, 
mostly through the lens of thinking about White concerns about losing their status to racial and 
ethnic minorities (Key and Heard 1949; Blalock 1967; Jardina 2014). Though this work provides 
important insights into the workings of race in American politics, in building a portable theory of 
in-group policing and respectability, I am less interested here in individuals’ concerns about 
competition over resources or power, than in their response to threats that call into question the 
value or worth of their social identity. And though these threats may be external to the group 
(e.g. Pérez 2015), brought about by negative portrayals or depictions of the group by outsiders, 
for example, threats to the image of the group may also be perceived as emerging from within—
the consequence of individual group members’ behaviors or ways of being. 
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As Cohen and Garcia note, “individual psychology is affected by collective outcomes” 
(2005, 566). These “collective threats,” as the authors regard them, “issue from the awareness 
that the poor performance of a single individual in one’s group may be viewed through the lens 
of a stereotype and may be generalized into a negative judgment of one’s group” (2005, 566). 
Consistent with much of the work on stereotype threat in psychology and elsewhere (Spencer, 
Steele, and Quinn 1999; Steele and Aronson 1995; Steele, Spencer, and Aronson 2002; Lewis Jr 
and Sekaquaptewa 2016), Cohen and Garcia examine this phenomenon by focusing on 
individuals’ responses to the threat of group members performing poorly on intellectual tasks. 
The authors find that African American students reported lower levels of self-esteem, had 
depressed GPAs, and lower feelings of self-efficacy when they perceived (or were 
experimentally manipulated to perceive) that judgments would be made about their racial group 
based on the performance of other Black students. And though these authors restrict their 
analyses to the academic realm, there is no reason to believe that these collective threats emerge 
only in this domain (Lewis Jr and Sekaquaptewa 2016).  
In this section, I want to consider first the emotional responses to collective threat that 
may give rise to the in-group policing that represents a critical manifestation of the politics of 
respectability. In the next section, I want to consider the more material nature of collective 
threats that move us beyond a simple emotional underpinning of respectability to account for 
other considerations that are brought to bear in the face of these collective threats. But first, let us 
consider the kind of emotional responses that are likely to emerge as a consequence of collective 
threats to the group’s image and why these emotional responses may cause individuals to 
monitor or attempt to alter the behavior that evokes these negative emotional reactions.  
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Because collective threats implicate individuals’ sense of who they are, individuals may 
experience shame in the face of perceived threats to the group’s image. Shame, like pride, guilt, 
and embarrassment, is a complex social emotion that requires that individuals have some sense 
of the social world they occupy.  
 
First individuals have to have absorbed a set of standards, rules and goals. Second, they 
have to have a sense of self. And finally, they have to be able to evaluate the self with 
regard to those standards, rules and goals and make a determination of success or failure. 
(Lewis 1995, 68) 
 
Though we often think about the experience of shame and other emotions at the individual level, 
we regularly experience emotions as members of larger collectives (Lickel, Schmader, and 
Barquissau 2004; Lickel et al. 2005; Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005). Just as it manifests at 
the individual level, group-based shame goes beyond recognizing that what some member of the 
groups has done is bad; it is an emotion that is evoked when one feels that, as a consequence of 
that transgression, the group is bad, and importantly, that others will make a judgment of the 
group’s character based on the violation (Orey et al. 2013). Moreover, as a discrete emotion, 
shame is often associated with withdrawal or distancing, such that when experienced at the group 
level, we should expect individuals to create greater distance between themselves and the 
offending member of the group (Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Lickel et al. 2005). Johns 
and colleagues, for example, find that when American undergrads are asked to recall instances in 
which their fellow citizens behaved in a prejudiced fashion toward Middle Easterners, those who 
identified as American reported higher feelings of shame and a greater desire to distance 
themselves from the perpetrator, their American identity, and from the situation in general. 
Though this tendency associated with experiences of shame (the desire to distance 
oneself from the group) is important as we consider the politics of respectability and the 
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tendency among members of a group to police the behavior of others within the group, we might 
also consider that shame serves a social function—that it warns us that we are “socially 
unacceptable” in a given moment (Gilbert 1998), thus encouraging us to alter our future behavior 
as a means to avoid experiencing this behavior in future contexts. In one of the few political 
science texts that concerns itself with the engagement of identity threats among stigmatized 
groups, García Bedolla (2003), through the use of 100 in-depth interviews, finds that Latinos 
concerned with the negative stereotypes associated with Spanish language in the United States 
are more likely to want to dissociate themselves from those within the group who speak Spanish, 
and some are also more likely to insist that members of the community speak English. Though 
she does not use the phrase in this work, what she describes is a kind of in-group policing. And 
just as these feelings of shame and embarrassment, captured in Bedolla’s interviews, may 
motivate Latinos to support anti-immigrant policies, such as English-only policies, we should 
expect that shame and embarrassment are similarly related to the politics of respectability as it 
emerges among Black Americans. Though the stereotypes and negative associations of 
Blackness are somewhat different from those associated with Latinos, the threatening nature of 
negative stereotypes may similarly evoke this aversive emotion and its subsequent corrective 
responses. Consequently, it is important to understand these processes, insofar as these corrective 
responses lead to support for punitive policies thought to deter this potentially threatening 
behavior.   
And though the connection between shame and the politics of respectability has yet to be 
established in the extant literature, legal scholar Randall Kennedy makes the case for this linkage 
by describing his own family background. 
In our household we felt tremendous pride in the attainment of blacks, and we took 
personally their disgrace. My father and mother loved to regale us with stories about the 
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accomplishments of Jackie Robinson and Wilma Rudolph, Thurgood Marshall and 
Charles Drew, Paul Robeson and Mary McLeod Bethune. At the same time, when 
scandal ensnared a prominent black person, we all felt ashamed, diminished. We were 
also embarrassed when Blacks with poor diction and sloppy comportment appeared on 
television. We were taught to look down on such people as “bad Negroes” whose antics 
further burdened “good Negroes” like us, and we suspected that whites in the news and 
entertainment industries preferred to publicize the former and ignore the latter…My 
parents sternly ordered their children to be dignified in the presence of white people so 
that there would be no opportunity to put us in racist, stereotypical categories. “Don’t act 
like a coon,” they told us bluntly. “Don’t act like a nigger.” (2015) 
 
Beyond Emotions: The Instrumental Arm of Collective Threats and the Politics of 
Respectability 
 
In the foregoing section, I discussed at length the possibility that feelings of shame in the 
face of collective threats may cause individuals to engage in the kind of in-group policing that is 
designed to alter the behavior of offending group members. Emotions are quite powerful in 
shaping individuals’ engagement in politics, and I argue they are also tightly bound up with 
Black support for punitive social policies. One of the central claims of social identity theory is 
that it confers upon us a sense of psychological connection to a group, and this connection can 
cause us to experience a range of vicarious emotions as members of these collectives (H. Tajfel 
and Turner 1986). Social identities, however, do much more than give us a sense of who we are 
in the social world. They also orient and affect our place in it. Social identities, after all, are not 
merely psychologically meaningful. They are politically, socially, and historically situated and 
are typically arrayed on a hierarchy of privilege and subjugation. That is, membership in 
politically relevant social group categories affords individuals varying levels of access to the 
good life and cannot be fully understood when considered absent this context (Huddy 2001) .  
With this in mind, thinking about collective threats only from the perspective of the 
emotional burden they portend for members of stigmatized groups seems incomplete. 
Individuals, particularly those who belong to stigmatized social categories, are not merely 
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worried that the bad behavior of in-group members will bring about aversive emotions like 
shame. Emotions, important though they are, are only a part of the story. In fact, they may not 
even be the most important part of the story. In a society stratified by salient social categories, 
identities do much more than bind us to similar others, such that we have emotional responses as 
a consequence of our group’s successes and failures (Cialdini et al. 1976; Snyder, Lassegard, and 
Ford 1986). More than that, identities structure real and tangible outcomes that make life better 
or worse for individuals, depending on which side of the stratification they find themselves. And 
just as emotional considerations may motivate individuals to police the behavior of similar others 
as a means of avoiding the negative experience of these emotions, we should, consistent with 
Higginbotham’s telling, consider more instrumental motivations.  
In Higginbotham’s description of respectability in the Black Baptist church, we are 
provided a rich description of respectability as a conscious political strategy intended to upend a 
system of de jure and de facto discrimination in the United States. Higginbotham goes to great 
lengths to describe the ways in which Black women encouraged the kinds of behavior that would 
challenge negative stereotypes of Blacks, thus rendering them worthy of equal treatment by 
Whites. Implicit in this consideration of respectability is an understanding that outcomes for the 
whole are predicated, at least in part, on the behavior of individual group members. This concern 
about the possibility of a collective threat to the group is not about emotions, per se, though we 
should expect that concerns about these more instrumental threats are not wholly separable from 
the experience of negative emotions previously discussed. In thinking about social identity in 
political science, concerns about the instrumental nature of collective threats are noticeably 
absent. The historical record, however, provides ample reasons to take seriously the possibility 
that individuals, in rendering judgments about in-group members’ behavior, consider the 
  25 
likelihood that these actions will have implications for the group. Again, a consideration of the 
historical record as it pertains to the experiences of Black people in the United States makes clear 
why individuals may adopt a view that the actions of one can have consequences for the whole. 
 Harris-Perry (2011) reminds us, for example, that “Southern lynch mobs and Northern 
white race riots made no allowance for the innocent [Black] people in the path of their 
murderous hunts for ‘black criminals’” (pgs. 117-118). Dawson (1994), in presenting the Black 
Utility Heuristic, notes similarly that it is rational for Black Americans to use the interests of the 
group as a proxy for their own given the indiscriminate nature with which Jim Crow laws and 
informal sanctions affected Black people. In detailing the emergence of secondary 
marginalization among Blacks, Cohen (1999) highlights the belief among some members of the 
group that an airing of the group’s dirty laundry would make it more difficult for Blacks aspiring 
to incorporate into the mainstream, more powerful echelons of society. Importantly, the politics 
of respectability and in-group policing among Black Americans ought not be thought of as some 
simple internalization of negative stereotypes about the group or be thought of as emerging 
independent of a continued system of White supremacy in the United States (c.f. Orey et al. 
2013). The politics of respectability, as understood in this context, reflects an unequal social 
hierarchy wherein members of stigmatized groups understandably believe that the circumstances 
of their own lives are determined not simply by the choices they make, but by the choices and 
behaviors of similar others.    
These concerns, though more instrumental in nature, are not void of psychological 
underpinnings. We know from the psychological literature that individuals are well aware of 
others’ beliefs about them and members of their social groups (Klein and Azzi 2001; 
Owuamalam et al. 2013; Yzerbyt, Judd, and Muller 2009). These so-called meta-perceptions 
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matter, particularly when coupled with the history of subjugation attached to stigmatized 
identities. Put plainly, many Black Americans know what White people think about them. They 
are also likely aware that Whites, as a group, wield a disproportionate amount of societal power 
and may, as some Whites have in the past, use that power indiscriminately against Blacks and 
other racial and ethnic minorities. The engagement in negative, stereotype-confirming behavior 
by an in-group member, therefore, may not only be perceived as threatening one’s psychological 
sense of self; it may also be viewed as making life more difficult for others in the group in real, 
material, and tangible ways.  
And though these instrumental concerns have largely escaped the examination of scholars 
focused on identity in the American context, they are wholly in keeping with important work in 
comparative politics that acknowledges the important role in-group policing plays in maintaining 
comity between opposing social groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Fearon and Laitin, in their 
seminal work on the topic, examine in-group policing as a mechanism that prevents a sort of 
“spiraling equilibrium” wherein groups are constantly fighting one another, thus undercutting the 
ability of ethnic groups to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. To avoid this spiraling 
equilibrium, individuals monitor, police, and punish bad behavior from within their own group, 
making it less necessary for those in opposing groups to engage in more indiscriminate forms of 
punishment. Importantly, Fearon and Laitin’s account of in-group policing assumes a level of 
parity between these opposing groups, an assumption that does not hold in an examination of 
Black-White relations in the United States. Though the authors do acknowledge that smaller 
groups may face greater incentives to maintain positive relationships with larger out-groups 
rather than vice-versa, the narrative they present is largely silent on the role that power plays in 
conditioning the likelihood that groups are concerned with how their members’ behavior will 
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affect other groups’ willingness to afford them access to the good life. Insofar as groups engage 
in in-group policing, we should expect that the more stigmatized and least powerful groups will 
be most likely to engage in this costly monitoring behavior.   
To be sure, there are important differences in thinking about respectability as it manifests 
among Black Americans and the kind of in-group policing discussed in the comparative politics 
literature. One may wonder, for example, whether in-group policing requires some principal who 
takes the lead in exacting punishment on the transgressive group member. If so, can there exist 
in-group policing without the presence of such a leader? Moreover, one may wonder whether 
there is something qualitatively different about the kinds of concerns one might have in thinking 
about trading relationships with another ethnic group and the concerns Black Americans may 
have about the reifying of an unequal social hierarchy in the United States. These are valid 
questions to consider, but the existing literature on in-group policing provides, more than any 
other work in the field, a useful lens through which to think about the sorts of intragroup 
dynamics that may inspire individuals to punish group members who threaten the status of the 
group by engaging in behavior that the out-group may view as transgressive in nature. To the 
extent that there are important differences in how we should think about in-group policing in this 
context relative to other contexts in which it has been considered, this project provides a useful 
framework to extend and broaden the scope of the concept. 
 
Collective Threats and Punishment 
 In the preceding sections I have attempted to provide a tractable and portable theoretical 
framework for thinking about why individuals, particularly those who belong to stigmatized 
groups, may take up the politics of respectability or embrace their own form of in-group 
policing. I want to spend some time here connecting this framework even more clearly to 
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individuals’ attitudes about punitive social policies perceived to affect members of their social 
group. Again, we know from the existing literature that individuals come to think about politics 
in group-based terms. Eschewing more ideological or principled considerations, they ask 
different, more proximate questions about who benefits or who is affected (Converse 1964; 
Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Nelson and Kinder 1996). To wit, all politics is identity politics. As is 
widely accepted by many in our field, these group-based considerations certainly matter when 
thinking about the preferences of dominant group members toward members of subjugated 
classes. At base, one of the most straightforward yet important claims of this dissertation is that 
group-based concerns matter for the subjugated, too, and not just in the solidarity motivating 
way. Stated more plainly, we cannot think about the politics of punishment without taking stock 
of the considerations of those who belong to the very group that is the target of this punishment.  
To be sure, this work is not the first to think about Black attitudes about punishment. For 
example, recent works by James Forman Jr. (2017) and Michael Fortner (2015) provide 
important historical discussion on this subject. Forman, a legal scholar, writes compellingly 
about his experience as a public defender in a jurisdiction filled with Black judges, Black 
prosecutors, Black jurors, and Black elites. Those whom Forman represented, therefore, were not 
typically at the mercy of resentful Whites, but they experienced an overly punitive criminal 
justice system, nonetheless. In thinking about the emergence and maintenance of a system of 
mass incarceration and tough sentencing in the U.S., Forman warns against a narrative structure 
that focuses solely on the predilections of Whites at the expense of understanding what might 
undergird the attitudes of those whom he encountered most in his day-to-day representation of 
young, and often poor, Black defendants. Through a rich consideration of his own experience 
and the goings-on of the day, Forman provides great insight into the real concerns Black 
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communities had about safety and the proliferation of drugs and violence on the streets of their 
neighborhoods. These folks, as Forman describes them, were not social scientists thinking about 
the structural and unequal consequences of tough drug laws and increased police surveillance. 
They were often the victims of the very crimes perpetrated by those within the group and simply 
wanted safer, better communities within which they could live and make a life for themselves 
and their families.  
Fortner’s work takes a similar approach, focusing more centrally on Black support for the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws, which he regards as one of the earliest examples of tough-on-crime laws 
that garnered the support of White and Black Americans. This “black silent majority,” Fortner 
writes, “did not blame ‘the cumulative ugliness and deterioration’ they experienced on racism or 
economic restructuring” (2015, 65). They instead saw their problems as being mostly the 
consequence of other Blacks whom they held in low regard. They thought of Black gangsters, 
Blacks who were out of work and perceived to be happily dependent on government service. 
They saw Blacks they regarded as less respectable, and thus deserving of whatever punishment 
came their way. These perceptions, Fortner contends, motivated middle-class Blacks and other 
Black elites to support a range of punitive crime policies that would go on to form the basis for 
the system of mass incarceration we have today.  
Forman and Forman’s accounts of this history are useful, as they provide an instructive 
backdrop from which to consider Black attitudes about punishment. Moreover, they suggest that 
Black support for punitive social policies may not simply be the result of some mainstreaming of 
Black politics, as Tate argues in work focused on understanding what she views as a 
conservative turn in Black politics in recent years (Tate 2010). Black support for punishment, as 
Forman and Fortner contend, has long and deep historical roots, and as the empirical chapters of 
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this dissertation evince, extend beyond considerations of drug policy and criminal sentencing. 
And though I see the current project as complementing aspects of Forman and Fortner’s work, I 
also part company with these authors in important ways. Black attitudes about punishment, I 
contend, are not simply responses to threats of violence or to concerns about the effects drugs 
and criminal behavior will have on the Black family or on Black communities. It is hard to 
maintain the argument, for example, that Black support for restrictions on workplace hairstyles 
or sartorial choices or an endorsement of restrictive welfare policies is rooted in some real 
perception that, absent these policies, one’s own life is endangered. Moving beyond these 
explanations that center on individuals’ concern about their own safety and well-being, we can 
begin to consider other explanations that structure the way stigmatized individuals think about 
matters of public policy. 
I will lay out more clearly my hypotheses in subsequent chapters, but the main argument 
of this project is rather simple: Individuals who belong to stigmatized social groups will 
occasionally be perceived by members of these same groups as behaving in ways that threaten 
their social identity and their social status. These collective threats can be emotional or 
instrumental in nature. When these behaviors are perceived as threatening the group’s image, 
individual group members may feel that their own sense of self-esteem or self-worth is 
diminished. As a result, they may experience a range of negative emotions that motivate them to 
withdraw from or punish those offending members of the group. Insofar as these collective 
threats have instrumental components, individuals may worry that the bad behavior of group 
members will make life more difficult for the whole. This concern provides a more rational 
rooting of in-group policing and punishment, as group members punish those whose 
transgressions are perceived as forestalling or undermining progress for the whole.  
  31 
Before moving forward, I want to acknowledge that there are, of course, other 
explanations in the literature that may account for variation in Black public opinion toward 
punitive social policies. I discussed a couple explanations already when discussing the work of 
Forman (2017a) and Fortner (2015), but any student of American politics must begin with the 
assumption that partisan identification, the sine qua non of American’s political beliefs, plays 
some role in affecting individuals’ policy preferences. Partisan identification is central to our 
understanding of how individuals arrive at a range of political judgments. Among African-
Americans, however, there is near-homogeneity in partisan identification (Carmines and Stimson 
1989; Dawson 1994). Even accounting for variation in the strength of attachment among Blacks, 
it is unlikely that wide-spread variation in Black public opinion regarding the death penalty, or 
other issues around which Black opinion is similarly divided, can be explained by these divides 
in attachment to the Democratic Party among Black Americans. Moreover, an expectation that 
partisan attachment plays a meaningful role in structuring attitudes toward these issues presumes 
both a clarity of elite cues with respect to these issues and high levels of citizen attention to the 
same. Given the diverse coalition of the Democratic Party that likely gives rise to disparate cues 
about punitive social policies (Zaller 1992) and the general inattentiveness of the American 
public to matters related to politics (Carpini and Keeter 1996), it is unlikely that partisan 
identification, skewed as it is for Black Americans, provides much leverage for understanding 
Black attitudes in this domain. 
There is, admittedly, greater heterogeneity in Black ideological identification than in 
partisan identification, but there is reason to believe that it too will perform poorly as a 
meaningful predictor of heterogeneity in Black public opinion. Converse (1964) warns that most 
Americans do not have an ideological anchor and are motivated instead by more basic and 
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group-centric concerns, as described earlier. Following up on this work, Kinder and Kalmoe 
(2017) make a similar argument based on empirical findings that demonstrate the deficient role 
ideological identification plays in structuring Americans’ preferences around a host of issues. 
More particular to Black Americans, I find in on-going work that ideological identification 
among Blacks is quite noisy and that it chiefly corresponds with political knowledge, with more 
politically sophisticated respondents adopting ideological labels more consistent with their 
expressed policy preferences (Jefferson n.d.). These findings are consistent with other work 
showing that Blacks and other groups are not ideologically constrained (e.g. Gay 2014). 
In the same vein, existing theoretical frameworks such as Dawson’s Black Utility 
Heuristic (1994), likely fall short in helping us make sense of variation in Black public opinion 
regarding punitive social policies that disproportionately target members of the in-group. 
Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic and its supplemental measure of linked fate are intended to 
help us understand black solidarity, and are, therefore, unlikely to give us much purchase in 
understanding why so many black Americans adopt positions seemingly at odds with their 
group’s interests. For example, the theory of linked fate, centered on individual rationality, 
cannot likely explain why nearly 40 percent of Black Americans support capital punishment, 
even as the policy disproportionately affects Black defendants. Further complicating 
expectations that linked fate will render much influence on our outcomes of interest is recent 
scholarship that finds scant evidence that linked fate is related to individuals’ policy preferences 
(Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016). 
The description of in-group policing laid out here may also be reminiscent for some of 
authoritarianism. Existing work on authoritarianism highlights differential tendencies toward 
conformity and the maintenance of social norms within society (Feldman 2003; Stellmacher and 
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Petzel 2005; Stenner 2005). Recent scholarship by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) demonstrates 
that the standard child-rearing battery meant to capture authoritarianism among the American 
public lacks a group invariant quality and falls short in predicting partisanship and other policy 
preferences among Blacks. With this work in mind, I am doubtful that authoritarianism – at least 
as traditionally measured – will fully account for variation in attitudes toward the policies I 
examine, but given my focus on policies that are more closely connected to concerns about 
behavior and comportment than is partisanship, I do not rule out this possibility. Moreover, I do 
not rule out, ex ante, that concerns about personal safety do not play a role in structuring Blacks’ 
attitudes about punishment, though I remain skeptical that these concerns condition individuals’ 
attitudes about policies that, if enacted, would do little to make individuals safer, but 
nevertheless serve a corrective or punitive function. 
In the next chapter, I present a measure of respectability (the Respectability Politics 
Scale) that reflects the theoretical foundation presented in the preceding pages of this chapter. As 
I introduce the measure, I present expectations regarding the profile of those Blacks we should 
expect to embrace the politics of respectability, with attention paid to the demographic, 
sociological, and psychological correlates of respectability as it manifests within the Black 
community. 
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Chapter 3: Toward a Measure of Respectability 
 
In preceding chapters, I have made the case for taking respectability seriously as a core 
feature of Black politics. More specifically, I have argued that wrestling with the meaning and 
influence of respectability is key to understanding how Black Americans come to think about 
and mete out punishment, particularly when that punishment is directed towards fellow Blacks. 
Consistent with Higginbotham’s (1993) rich historical work and arguments from across the 
social sciences, including frameworks in social psychology and comparative politics, I have 
presented a theoretical case that lays out both the emotional and instrumental roots of 
respectability. These sets of considerations, I argue, inform Black Americans’ attitudes toward 
punitive social policies—both criminal and otherwise. 
Respectability, as I note previously, is a familiar concept, both among scholars of Black 
politics and some members of the lay public. This familiarity, however, ought not preclude us 
from examining carefully claims regarding its influence on the life, culture, and politics of 
American society. To date, our understanding of respectability’s influence is based almost solely 
on historical and qualitative accounts. These accounts help ground our thinking about 
respectability, but leave unanswered a host of important descriptive and theoretical questions that 
motivate the current project. I lay out some of these questions here and will return to many of 
them throughout this chapter and those that follow. The purpose of outlining these questions, 
however, is not simply to set up guideposts one may turn to at other points in the manuscript. 
More than that, I hope these questions will impress upon the reader the necessity of adopting the 
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analytic approach I take here—one that attempts to examine quantitatively a set of theoretical 
expectations informed by more qualitative approaches that are already on offer. Importantly, the 
empirical strategy I adopt is not merely one of methodological convenience; it is one that affords 
us a unique opportunity to explore a range of theoretical possibilities not well suited for other 
analytic approaches. Paired with the arguments and contributions of work cited in the previous 
chapter, the instrumentation developed in this chapter will help us better understand how 
respectability shapes and influences Black public opinion.  
Before introducing a measure of respectability, a chief innovation of this project, I want 
to highlight some of the questions that remain on the table, despite the frequency with which 
respectability enters our academic and popular discourse. Higginbotham, in introducing the 
politics of respectability to the scholarly community, describes the belief set as one deeply rooted 
in the Black church. Respectability, Higginbotham tells us, was central to the way that Black 
religious women sought to advance the goals of the racial group. As you will recall, these women 
believed strongly that insisting on purity, charity, and proper comportment would help to upend 
systems of inequality by showing the racial group as worthy of equal treatment under law and by 
Whites. Higginbotham’s writing about these women raises obvious questions about the “who” of 
respectability politics. That is, what is the profile of those who are more or less likely to embrace 
the politics of respectability? What is the role of the Black church and other indigenous 
institutions? Perhaps even more fundamental than that, what is the demographic makeup of those 
who adopt and reject a worldview focused on the behavior and comportment of group members? 
Are they older or younger Black people? Is respectability gendered in such a way that Black men 
and Black women come to think about the principles of respectability differently? Are there 
aspects of respectability that are differentially applied in ways that reflect variation in stereotypes 
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applied to Black men and Black women (McConnaughy and White n.d.)? In what ways, and to 
what extent, is respectability the belief set of the Black bourgeoisie—reflective of middle-class 
values that have yet to trickle down to lower class Blacks? Or is respectability a worldview that 
persists across class and status divides, with Blacks on both ends of the distribution finding their 
own reasons to embrace the politics of respectability?  
Returning to questions about the influence of indigenous institutions on Blacks’ embrace 
of respectability, what precisely is the role of individuals’ attachment to the Black church, 
involvement in Black civil society, and exposure to Black media on their belief in the principles 
of respectability? Consistent with this set of questions that encourage us to consider Blacks’ 
attachment to and embeddedness within a broader Black community, what is the role of racial 
group identification on these beliefs? Are those who embrace respectability more or less attached 
to their racial group? Are these individuals who are closer to or farther away from other Blacks? 
Popular accounts, for example, may leave the impression that Blacks who embrace the politics of 
respectability have chosen to abandon their racial group or see their racial identity as being less 
important than those who more clearly reject its tenets.14 This popular account, however, runs 
counter to the implications of Higginbotham’s claims and others who regard these individuals as 
“race men” and “race women” whose feelings of connection to and concern for the racial group 
were precisely what motivated an embrace of respectability in the first place (see also Gaines 
2012). Relatedly, is there compelling evidence that respectability’s adherents have different or 
less favorable views of their racial group or that these views lead to the kind of in-group policing 
respectability foreshadows? Moreover, in line with a more instrumental treatment of 
                                                        
14 See this Change.org petition, for example, from an African-American calling on CNN to 
remove Don Lemon from the airwaves, given his approach to discussions of race and his public 
embrace of respectability. https://www.change.org/p/cnn-remove-don-lemon-from-cnn-2  
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respectability, what is the role of perceived discrimination and individuals’ concerns about 
potential threats to the group’s current or future status in giving rise to support for respectability? 
And, finally, in a complex social world in which considerations of all types have the potential to 
affect individuals’ judgments and decisions, does respectability play a unique role, above and 
beyond the myriad of other possible influences, in affecting the judgments Black Americans 
render about punitive social policies? 
This may well seem an exhausting set of questions to engage, but it is not at all 
exhaustive. There are, to be sure, other questions pertaining to the demographic, social, and 
psychological roots of respectability that are not reflected in this litany. I am, likewise, certain, 
that there are questions related to the influence of respectability on the politics of Black 
Americans that are simply beyond the scope of the current project. One might wonder, for 
example, whether and how respectability affects the kinds of protest strategies one adopts in 
response to perceived injustice or whether variation in respectability influences the kind of 
politician an individual chooses to support. I will have little to say about that in this manuscript, 
but point out these possible questions as a way of drawing the reader’s attention to all that we do 
not know about the politics of respectability, absent an attempt to carefully measure and assess it, 
both as a concept in its own right and as one that has potential implications for outcomes we care 
about as social scientists.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I begin by situating our thinking about respectability 
alongside similar constructs already found in the social sciences, namely vigilance and 
authoritarianism. In discussing these existing constructs, the goal is to help further contextualize 
the usefulness of this measure by distinguishing it from constructs that are already on offer. I 
then detail the process used to develop and construct the Respectability Politics Scale (RPS) and 
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present findings regarding the psychometric properties of the scale. In what is both an empirical 
and theoretical advance of the manuscript, I discuss the correlates of the RPS, which provides 
clarity about the nature of the instrument as a measurement device and helps us understand more 
about the mechanisms that foster support for respectability among certain pockets of the Black 
community. These discussions will help lay the groundwork for the analyses in the subsequent 
chapter that focus on exploring the explanatory leverage provided by the Respectability Politics 
Scale.  
Approximating Respectability: A Discussion of Existing Measures that inform the RPS 
 
As I note in the preceding sections, this project stands apart in its attempt to carefully 
examine the role respectability plays in affecting the political attitudes and behaviors of African 
Americans. That is not to say, however, that there have been no rigorous attempts to understand 
how African Americans navigate their stigmatized racial identity and how this experience with 
stigma affects various aspects of their lives. In fact, some of the work highlighted in the previous 
chapter does precisely that. Here, however, I want to focus more directly on scholarly attempts to 
capture these dynamics and concerns adjacent to respectability in the context of survey data. In 
presenting these examples, the goal is to help orient the reader’s thinking regarding the difficulty 
of capturing the phenomenon of respectability and to underscore the need for new 
instrumentation, given the questions that form the core of this current project.  
Vigilance 
I turn first to recent work that examines the health consequences of respectability politics 
for Black Americans. Noting the apparent relationship between impression management 
behaviors and the politics of respectability, Lee and Hicken (2016) explore whether and, if so, to 
what extent the constant monitoring of one’s own behavior has implications for one’s health. 
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Theoretically, the authors expect that this kind of vigilance, as they term it, has adverse 
consequences for individuals’ mental and physical health. Chronically engaging in these self-
regulatory behaviors, Lee and Hicken contend, is stressful and this stress, they argue, is related to 
a range of negative consequences for the self. Again, the theoretical arguments of this piece are 
interesting and important to consider in their own right, but I want to focus instead on the way 
that Lee and Hicken operationalize vigilance, a concept that is a close conceptual cousin of 
respectability. 
As they describe their measure of vigilance, it is an abbreviated and slightly modified 
version of a vigilance scale first developed for the 1995 Detroit Area Study. The scale was 
originally intended to capture anticipation of and preparation for racial discrimination (pg. 429). 
As part of the vigilance scale, respondents are asked the following: In your day-to-day life, how 
often do you do the following things: (1) try to prepare for possible insults from other people 
before leaving home; (2) feel that you always have to be very careful about your appearance to 
get good service or avoid being harassed; (3) try to avoid certain social situations and places; and 
(4) carefully watch what you say and how you say it. As Lee and Hicken acknowledge, these 
items make no mention of race, but they do appear to capture the kinds of impression 
management behaviors one might expect to observe from individuals who hold some belief that 
how they behave will have implications for how they experience the social world. Consistent 
with the authors’ expectations, Black respondents who report being more vigilant, as defined by 
higher scores on the vigilance scale, do report more chronic conditions over the life cycle and 
have more depressive symptoms than those who less frequently engage in these impression 
management behaviors. 
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The vigilance scale adopted in Lee and Hicken’s work is a useful one. It allows us to 
examine carefully the degree to which individuals engage in a range of behaviors that manifest 
as a consequence of their belonging to a stigmatized social group. The measure is particularly 
useful for engaging questions like the ones central to the authors’ analyses—ones focused on the 
consequences of respectability for the self. Recall, however, that the current project is not 
principally concerned with whether individuals vary in their own employment of behaviors we 
might regard as manifestations or demonstrations of respectability. That one, in her own 
movement in the world, frequently concerns herself with how she dresses or how she speaks may 
well give us some insight into the person’s own way of navigating her stigmatized identity, but it 
tells us little about her own sense that having to engage in this kind of monitoring is normatively 
good or even potentially effective. Vigilance, as operationalized by Lee and Hicken, is a self-
reflective measure that does allow us to examine, at least on some level, the ways in which the 
politics of respectability permeates the thinking of Black Americans. This measure of vigilance, 
however, does not align theoretically with a desire to understand the politics of respectability as a 
worldview or an ideology that bears on individuals’ political and social judgments. To be clear, 
the contention is not that vigilance and an embrace of respectability as a worldview are 
orthogonal concepts. One’s tendency to self-monitor as a function of stigma likely corresponds 
with one’s tendency to monitor the behavior of similar others. The argument, instead, is that 
vigilance is conceptually distinct from a politicized embrace of respectability. Stated plainly, one 
can engage in all sorts of vigilant behaviors on her own and for her own sake, without ever 
adopting a politicized view that her group’s fortunes would be improved, but for the bad 
behavior of some group members.  
Authoritarianism 
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Separately, because of the central role that concerns about behavior play in our thinking 
about the politics of respectability, I want to reiterate why it is not sufficient to simply use the 
standard measure of authoritarianism as a proxy for the politics of respectability. As I describe in 
Chapter 2, scholarship focused on authoritarianism centers largely on questions regarding 
individuals’ desire for conformity and their commitment to sets of societal norms (e.g. Stenner 
2005). The measure of authoritarianism most frequently used in contemporary work on the topic 
comprises a set of questions that asks respondents about their child rearing preferences. To 
measure authoritarian disposition, respondents are asked to rate the importance of various 
qualities for children. In turn, respondents are asked to choose whether independence is more 
important a quality than respect for elders, whether obedience is more important than self-
reliance, whether curiosity is more important than good manners, and whether being considerate 
is more important than being well-behaved. Respondents who ascribe greater importance to traits 
that one may describe as more orderly in nature are considered to have more authoritarian 
tendencies.  
For somewhat obvious reasons, it is tempting to expect that respondents’ answer choices 
on this battery of questions is a fine measure of capturing individuals’ underlying beliefs about 
how others, including group members, ought to behave. Setting aside whatever theoretical 
meaning we ordinarily associate with responses to these questions, it is hard to argue that the 
items are not capturing some lay beliefs about behavior—one item included in the battery, after 
all, asks directly about the importance of children being well-behaved. To be sure, this measure 
of authoritarianism must be accounted for moving forward, but there are two key reasons that I 
find it an insufficient and imperfect stand-in for individuals’ embrace of the politics of 
respectability.  
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The first reason pertains to the theoretical employment of the child rearing battery in the 
existing literature. As the previous chapter of the manuscript makes clear, the politics of 
respectability is characterized by its relationship to ego-centric and strategic goals. Though the 
theoretical meaning of authoritarianism for Black Americans remains in dispute, there is no 
existing theoretical frame that expects authoritarianism to have similar roots. Moreover, as Pérez 
and Hetherington (2014) note, Blacks’ responses to these items likely reflect more literal beliefs 
about child rearing. If they are right, as I think they are, this measure of authoritarianism is a 
potential confound with which the Respectability Politics Scale must contend. In the context of 
the current project, I treat responses to this child rearing battery as an indication of respondents’ 
general beliefs about the importance of conformity and norm following. I acknowledge that this 
treatment of the measure is somewhat different from the way it is considered by other scholars. 
That is, I am making no claims here about whether and to what extent the measure captures 
authoritarianism, per se, though I will use the term “authoritarianism” as a shorthand for what the 
scale purports to measure. I want to remain fairly agnostic to whether scores on the measure 
capture authoritarianism as some scholars suggest or whether they are the product of a battery 
that lacks group-invariant properties. Importantly, analyses in this chapter take seriously the 
possibility that the RPS is little more than authoritarianism measured in some other way. The 
results I present suggest that this is not the case. More than evidence demonstrating the 
distinctiveness of the two measures, all models focused on the predictive power of the RPS will 
include authoritarianism as a covariate. Insofar as the RPS is simply authoritarianism 
refashioned, this represents a particularly hard case, as the measure of respectability will be 
forced to contend with this broader and more familiar measure of individuals’ beliefs and 
preferences about behavior. 
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In sum, the landscape as it currently exists makes developing a theoretically driven 
measure of respectability a worthwhile endeavor to engage and one that I spend the remainder of 
this chapter discussing.  
Developing a Respectability Politics Scale 
 
Having established the gaps in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the role 
respectability plays in structuring the politics of Blacks Americans as it relates to punitive 
attitudes, this section aims to provide some insight into the work conducted to develop the 
Respectability Politics Scale. 
In setting out to develop a measure of respectability, I adopted a few guiding principles. I 
wanted the measure to be a simple one, while also reflecting the nuances of respectability as 
articulated by the existing literature and my own theorizing in this project. In brief, that meant 
developing a measure that, in plain language, captures the elements associated with 
respectability—an insistence on good behavior to protect the image of the group (ego-centric 
arm of respectability) and an insistence on good behavior to advance the strategic goals of the 
group (instrumental arm of respectability). Instead of relying on vague terminology, I wanted the 
items of the scale to be easily understood by laypeople and easy to employ in the context of a 
sample survey. In developing the items for the scale, I paired Higginbotham’s discussion of 
respectability in the historical case of the Black Baptist Church with more contemporary 
discussions of the topic. Moreover, the items reflect my own experience and embeddedness 
within the Black community, which provides some initial intuition about how the various 
theoretical elements of respectability are articulated by the masses.  
Pilot Testing a Measure of Respectability 
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With the goal of developing a valid measure of respectability that captures the theoretical 
components of the construct and allows for further analyses pertaining to the influence of 
respectability on Black public opinion, I developed a battery of 17 questions to capture variation 
in the kinds of attitudes I thought reflected different aspects of respectability as it might manifest 
in the minds of Black Americans. Again, this initial battery of questions is based on my careful 
read of material related to the politics of respectability and on my own theoretical and personal 
understanding of how respectability is discussed and how it emerges among Blacks. This set of 
questions was refined through several meetings with experts on survey research to ensure that the 
questions followed good practices in survey design and that responses to these items would 
provide a strong foundation from which to establish a shorter, more valid measure of the 
construct. The full set of items is included in the appendix at the end of this chapter, but I will 
discuss various features of the questions and introduce some sample items as I describe the pilot 
study on which this set of questions first appeared. 
In March 2017, I used Amazon’s Turkprime platform to recruit a sample of 265 Black 
Americans for this study. Two hundred and fifty-four respondents completed the study. This is a 
convenience sample and among those who participated in this study, 64 percent were female, the 
mean family income was between $40,000 and $49,999, the mean education level was “some 
college,” and the mean age category was 25-34. 
At the beginning of the survey, participants were told that “We are interested in 
understanding how people think about various policies and social groups. Please answer all the 
questions as completely as you can. Your responses will remain anonymous, so feel free to share 
with us your honest opinions.” Given the sensitivity of some of the items included in the study, it 
was important to include this language so respondents would feel freer to answer questions in 
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ways that reflected their sincere beliefs. Before replying to the set of items related to the politics 
of respectability, respondents answered several policy questions and questions related to their 
racial identity. The survey also included a number of questions related to group-based emotions, 
group-based esteem, authoritarianism and other covariates and predictors, including individual-
level measures of stereotype endorsement and racial resentment. For the sake of clarity, I did not 
exploit all the features of this pilot study in this dissertation and used it primarily to get an initial 
sense of the psychometric properties of the various items, with the goal of establishing a cleaner, 
more succinct, and more theoretically appropriate measure of the underlying construct.  
As displayed in Appendix 3A, questions in the battery varied in form and ranged from 
ones that specifically asked about individuals’ beliefs regarding hair and dress (“If Black people 
want to succeed in America, how important is it that they maintain professional hairstyles in the 
workplace? For example, how important is it that Black people avoid dreadlocks, braids, or other 
uncommon natural hairstyles while on the job?”) to more general questions about behavior and 
comportment (“How important is it that Black people act responsibly in public?”). Other items 
were intended to capture the belief that members of the group should behave in ways that 
heighten the esteem of the group (“How important is it that Black people carry themselves in 
ways that others will respect?”). Beyond picking up on these more esteem-based considerations, 
I also included items that captured variation in individuals’ sense of instrumental payoffs that 
might result from good behavior (“How likely is it that Black people would be treated better by 
society if members of their racial group behaved better?”). Because I was sure that some 
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questions would be more upsetting to participants than others, I randomized the order in which 
the questions were asked to minimize the effect of any one question on responses to others.15 
Looking at the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.1, we observe that respondents 
vary significantly in their responses to the questions presented in the battery. Respondents in the 
sample are least supportive of the notion that Black people should have to avoid certain 
hairstyles to get ahead in the workplace and are similarly reluctant to agree outright that it is 
important “for Black people to punish those members of the group who confirm negative 
stereotypes about the group.” On a 0-1 scale, mean responses for these two items are .19 and .33, 
respectively. Standing in stark contrast to these responses are respondent’s answers to some more 
general items included in the set. For example, when asked how important it is that Black 
peopled act responsibly in public, only 7 respondents (approximately 3 percent) answer that it 
not at all important. Similarly, we observe that respondents ascribe fairly high levels of support 
to the idea that members of the group should take responsibility for the way their lives turn out, 
that Black leaders should talk more about the problems within the community caused by Black 
people themselves, and that Black people should carry themselves in a way that contributes to a 
positive image of the group. Importantly, we observe variations in attitudes regarding what is 
referred to here as the instrumentality of respectability. When asked directly “how likely it is that 
Black people would be treated better by society if members of their racial group behaved better,” 
respondents vary significantly in their responses to this question. Though 21 percent of 
                                                        
15As it turns out, this was a good idea. Participants responded quite unfavorably to some of the 
questions in the battery. One respondent, for example, wrote the following in the open-ended text 
box at the end of the study: “’uncommon natural hairstyles’. I was unaware natural hair was 
uncommon. Ridiculous phrasing and nothing has ever gotten me more frustrated then hearing 
that my natural hair was unprofessional.” Fortunately for this respondent, this item does not 
appear in later iterations of the Respectability Politics Scale.  
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respondents adopt the view that it is “extremely unlikely” that Black people would be treated 
better by society if behavior improved, nearly 19 percent of respondents think it “moderately” or 
“extremely likely” that society’s treatment of Blacks would improve if Black people behaved 
better. Relatedly, respondents divide when asked about the relationship between good behavior 
from within the group and White attitudes about equality for Blacks. On the question of how 
important it is that group members behave better if they want to convince White people that they 
deserve equality, 36 percent of respondents say that it is “not at all important,” though 18 percent 
answer that it is “extremely important.”  
Table 3.1 about here 
This descriptive data about these individual items are instructive and provide the first 
detailed reporting of variation in Black people’s thinking about behavior and comportment 
within the group. It remains unclear, however, based on these descriptive findings, how the 
various items fit together and the extent to which some items are more or less necessary in 
helping us capture the core elements of respectability. To minimize the question set in service of 
practical and theoretical aims, I used factor analytic tools to help develop the Respectability 
Politics Scale, which is essentially a set of questions designed to capture the latent concept that is 
the politics of respectability. I describe in additional detail features of the items as they emerge in 
the more representative study discussed later in the chapter. 
To begin the process of constructing the RPS, I relied on an exploratory factor analysis to 
examine the factor structure of the battery of questions I developed. The exploratory factor 
analysis allows one to uncover the shared variance between items to gain some sense of the 
underlying dimensionality and structure of the latent concept. In line with best practices (e.g. 
Carpenter 2018), I used principal factor analysis with oblique rotation, which allows for the 
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possibility that factors of the construct correlate, as they often do in social scientific research, 
and as I expected they would in this case. Table 3.2 presents the results of the rotated factor 
analysis. Without constraining the analysis, we observe that the EFA retains 9 factors. Not all of 
these retained factors are equally meaningful, however. To gauge the meaningfulness of factors, 
I used two techniques. First, I analyzed a scree plot of the eigenvalues after the factor analysis, 
with an eye toward retaining the factors that had eigenvalues above the point where the plot 
begins to level off. In Figure 3.1, we observe that the first and second factors appear to meet this 
criterion. Additionally, we observe, again in Table 3.2, that the correspondence between the 
various items and other factors are relatively low, with several items loading strongly onto the 
first two factors (>.6). Interestingly, Figure 3.2 clearly shows that there is little crossloading 
between the items that correspond with the two primary factors. Furthermore, the two factors 
correlate only moderately (r=.55). This may result from the nature of the questions that comprise 
each factor, but we will return to this point when analyzing the distributions and other particulars 
of the two factors.  
 
Table 3.2 about here 
 
Figure 3.1 about here 
 
Figure 3.2 about here 
 
Turning our attention to the first factor, three items that capture general beliefs about how 
Blacks should behave in public loaded strongly onto this factor.  These questions ask how 
important it is for Blacks to behave responsibly in public, carry themselves in ways that others 
will respect, and behave in ways that contribute to a positive image of the group. Further 
evidence is required to test precisely what motivations or considerations align with responses to 
these items, but each of these questions asks respondents to give their sense of the importance of 
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Blacks behaving well, with each item highlighting the gaze of some other. The second factor that 
emerged appears to nicely capture the instrumental nature of respectability, harkening back to 
Higginbotham’s discussion of respectability as a means by which women in the Black Baptist 
Church believed they could achieve greater equality for the group. Items that gauge respondents’ 
sense that Blacks need to behave better to be treated better by society and to convince White 
people that they deserve equality correspond highly with this factor. Based on these analyses, the 
final RPS includes the following items.16 17 
 
1. RP1_Responsibly: How important is it that Black people behave responsibly in 
public? [Not at all important-Extremely important]  
2. RP2_OthersRespect: How important is it that Black people carry themselves in 
ways that others will respect? [Not at all important-Extremely important] 
3. RP3_PositiveImage: How important is it that Black people behave in ways that 
contribute to a positive image of the group? [Not at all important-Extremely 
important] 
4. RP4_DeserveEquality: If Black people want to convince White people that they 
deserve equality, how important is it that members of the group behave better? [Not 
at all important-Extremely important] 
5. RP5_TreatedBetter: How likely is it that Black people would be treated better by 
society if members of their racial group behaved better? [Extremely unlikely-
Extremely likely] 
 
As currently constructed, the RPS has two subscales, consisting of the questions related 
to the first and second factors. Because I think of these subscales as jointly capturing elements of 
respectability, I constructed a composite measure, the RPS, which has a Cronbach’s alpha of .83, 
suggesting high levels of internal consistency among the measures. To further unpack and refine 
the measure of respectability, however, I will attend both to the features and influence of the 
                                                        
16 In constructing the final scale, I decided to exclude items that were too specific in nature, 
either in the stereotypes they highlighted or the behavior respondents were asked to judge. 
Because these behaviors (e.g. being loud in public or dressing poorly) are likely outcome 
variables in this project and others, I did not want to generate a scale that would invoke them. 
17 Hereafter, these items will be referred to as R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5, for brevity. 
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composite measure and the subscales that comprise it. For the purposes of the current 
manuscript, I prioritize analyses of the 5-item composite measure in the inference-making 
process, but believe it important to carefully interrogate the subscales as I seek to refine and 
further develop the measure of respectability. 
Focusing first on the full RPS, we observe in Figure 3.3 that responses to the full set of 
items skewed toward the higher end of the scale. If the scale is, as I argue, capturing variations in 
individual attitudes about the politics of respectability, it appears that many, at least in this 
convenience sample, readily embrace this worldview. Recoded 0-1, with higher values indicative 
of a stronger embrace of respectability, the RPS has a mean value of .61 and a median value of 
.60. Turning next to the two individual factors, we observe quite a high median score for the first 
factor focused on the general importance of good behavior by group members (.75). As alluded 
to earlier, we observe much more variation in the second factor, which gauges respondents’ 
sense that behavior from within the group is bound up with its treatment by Whites and society 
writ large. The median score on this factor is .46, though it should be pointed out that most 
respondents accept, at varying degrees, the idea that their group’s treatment is linked to how 
members of the group behave. For example, when asked about the likelihood that Blacks would 
be treated better by society if members of the group behaved better, more than one-third of 
respondents expressed a belief that better behavior would likely lead to better treatment. 
Likewise, 35 percent of respondents answer that it is “very” or “extremely” important for Blacks 
to behave better if they want to convince White people that they deserve equality. 18 
                                                        
18 In this data, we also observe several interesting relationships between the measure of 
respectability I introduce here and various outcomes of interest, though for clarity, I will discuss 
empirical findings from the YouGov data only in this chapter. The MTurk findings are analogous 
and would, therefore, be repetitive. 
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Figure 3.3 about here 
These initial findings from the MTurk study are interesting and instructive. They provide 
for us the first opportunity to examine measures related to the politics of respectability and help 
establish a foundation from which to think about the potential influence of respectability on the 
politics of Black Americans. Based on the results of the MTurk study and my sense that the RPS 
was a promising first step in allowing for the rigorous examination of respectability among a 
more representative sample, I contracted with YouGov, a survey firm with a reputation for 
providing high-quality samples, particularly for researchers interested in diverse populations.19 
Though not a probability sample, YouGov draws from a stratified sample and uses sample 
matching to approximate the demographics of the US population.20 For this project, YouGov 
sampled 500 black Americans using their online panel starting July 6, 2017. Data collection 
concluded on July 14, 2017. The weighted sample is 54% female, has a mean age of 35-44, a 
mean education of “some college,” and a mean income of around $30-000-$39,000. Forty-seven 
percent reported having spent the majority of their life in the South and nearly 88% reported that 
religion was at least slightly important to their life, with a plurality of respondents reporting that 
religion was extremely important to their life. Using this more representative sample, I first 
confirm the factor structure of the Respectability Politics Scale, paying careful attention to both 
the composite measure and its constitutive parts. I then return to the questions at the start of this 
chapter that probe the demographic, social, and psychological correlates of the measure.  
                                                        
19 https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/05/13/pew-research-yougov/ 
20 All reports of distributions use weighted data. Regression models, however, are unweighted, as 
weighted OLS in the data decreases efficiency and increases standard errors. The models also all 
include the variables on which the weights were developed. Weighting the data does not change 
the results.  
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Theoretical Expectations Regarding the Correlates of Respectability 
To orient the reader, let me lay out a few testable expectations regarding the profile of 
those whom I expect will be most likely to embrace the politics of respectability in the sample. 
First, given that respectability concerns itself with the behavior of others, I expect that older 
Blacks, relative to their younger counterparts, will score higher on the RPS. And to the extent 
that the values of respectability reflect class distinctions among Blacks, I expect that higher 
income African-Americans will be more likely to endorse respectability than those from lower 
class backgrounds, though recall my initial suggestion that those at either end of the economic 
distribution may feel the need to embrace the politics of respectability, albeit for different 
reasons. For many Black Americans, religion also plays a powerful role in structuring beliefs 
about how one ought to be in the world (Walton 1985). Moreover, as Higginbotham notes, 
respectability is often a feature of conversations within the Black church. Blacks for whom 
religion occupies a more central role in their lives should, therefore, be more likely to endorse 
respectability as well.  
 Consistent with previous discussions in this chapter and elsewhere, I also expect that 
those whom we would regard as having more authoritarian predispositions are also more likely 
to embrace the politics of respectability. Regarding the role of perceived discrimination in 
structuring Blacks’ beliefs about respectability, the expectations are more complicated than some 
others. On one hand, we might expect that Black Americans who perceive more discrimination 
toward the group will reject the tenets of respectability, as they can be perceived as taking 
attention away from the role discrimination plays in affecting the life outcomes of Blacks. On the 
other hand, and consistent with an instrumental view of respectability, we might expect that 
those who perceive greater discrimination toward the group will be more inclined to embrace 
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respectability as a means of challenging the biases of White Americans. Regardless of the 
direction of the finding, the empirical analyses will help us clarify the meaningfulness of these 
perceptions in our consideration of respectability moving forward. 
Beyond these demographic and sociological considerations, our theoretical setup expects 
correspondence between respectability and a set of important psychological considerations. First, 
insofar as the politics of respectability reflects concerns about the image of the racial group, we 
should find correspondence between the measure of respectability and concepts that tap how one 
feels about the in-group. More specifically, we should find that negative emotions, like shame, 
experienced at the group level, are associated with higher scores on the RPS. Though somewhat 
counter-intuitive, to the extent that the kinds of concerns imbedded within the framework of 
respectability represent threats to the social identity, we should also expect that higher identifiers 
will be more likely to endorse respectability than those for whom the identity is less important. 
Such a finding would be consistent with work by stigma researchers who find that high 
identifiers concern themselves more with the stigmatized nature of the group and, thus, respond 
more strongly to the kinds of identity threats that could motivate an embrace of the politics of 
respectability (Quinn et al. 2014). Likewise, I expect that an endorsement of negative stereotypes 
about the group also correspond with respectability, as it seems unlikely that one who thinks very 
well of the group already would have much motivation to encourage group members to behave 
better. Again, I will test these expectations using the full RPS and its two separate factors. 
Validating the Respectability Politics Scale 
Before examining more carefully the distribution and predictors of the RPS and its 
constitutive parts, let us first explore the structure of the RPS using this more representative data. 
To test the structure of the measure, I used a confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether the 
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scale maintained its two-factor structure in this data to reflect the theorized dimensionality of 
respectability—that it has at its core a general sense of how group members should behave and 
an investment in the strategic payoff of good behavior (i.e. better treatment by white 
Americans).21 First, as shown in Figure 3.4, each item of the RPS loaded significantly onto its 
respective factor, mirroring the results from the MTurk pilot study. Looking at the first three 
items of the scale, we observe that RP1_Responsibly, RP2_OthersRespect, and 
RP3_PositiveImage load strongly onto what we call the general factor. Reflecting the results of 
the exploratory factor analysis, these items loaded significantly onto this first factor, with 
loadings of .78, .91, and .87, respectively. Similarly, RP4_DeserveEquality and 
RP5_TreatedBetter, which tap more into individuals’ beliefs about the strategic or instrumental 
payoffs of respectability, load strongly onto this second factor, with loadings of .69 and .83, 
respectively. As previously mentioned, the theoretical expectation is that these two factors jointly 
reflect the tenets of respectability. In line with this thinking, I allowed the factors to correlate in 
the CFA analysis. As we observe, again in Figure 3.4, the correlation between the two factors 
(r=.58) is significant, suggesting the factors are not independent of each other and share a 
moderate, positive association. 
Figure 3.4 about here 
Turning next to testing the goodness of fit of the model, the chi-square value for the 
overall model was significant, c2(4) = 10.50, p<.05. This suggests that the covariance matrix 
implied by the model was different from that observed in the data. Because the c2 test is 
sensitive to sample size, however, “it should not serve as the sole basis for judging model fit” 
                                                        
21 I use Stata 14’s Structural Equation Modeling package to conduct these analyses.  
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(Kline 2015; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, and Müller 2003). Turning to these other 
assessments of model fit, RMSEA=.058, CFI=.994, and SRMR=.019, indicating adequate model 
fit (Hu and Bentler 1999; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, and Müller 2003).22 Modification 
indices suggested a possible path between RP2 (i.e. “How important is it that Black people carry 
themselves in ways that others will respect?”) and the strategic factor of the RPS. Though not a 
path implied by the model I tested, this potential modification seems plausible theoretically, 
given this item primes respondents to think about how others (presumably Whites) may view or 
respond to group members’ behavior.  
Unpacking the RPS and its Correlates 
In this section, I examine the distribution of the RPS, its two factors, and the correlates of each. 
All items are standardized from 0-1 for ease of interpretation, with higher values indicative of 
higher levels of respectability. Before delving into the particulars of the RPS, let us consider the 
two factors independently.  
Factor 1 Analyses: Recall, Factor 1 of the RPS consists of items that ask respondents 
about how important it is for members of the group to behave responsibly, to behave in ways that 
others will respect, and to behave in ways that contribute to a positive image of the group. The 
CFA demonstrated that these items loaded together strongly on a single factor and the 
Cronbach’s alpha for these three items is .89, suggesting further that there is high inter-item 
                                                        
22The RMSEA is the root mean squared error of approximation. Values range from 0-1; smaller 
values indicate better model fit. .06 or lower indicate acceptable model fit. The CFI is the 
comparative fit index, which compares the hypothesized model to the model that best fits the 
data. Again, values range from 0-1; larger CFI values indicate better fit. CFI>.95 indicates good 
fit. The SRMR is the standardized root mean square residual, which compares the covariance 
matrix of the sample with that of the hypothesized model. Values range from 0-1 and values of 
.08 or less indicate that the model is acceptable. (Note: Cutoffs taken from (Hu and Bentler 
1999)).  
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correlation amongst these questions in the data. As observed in the MTurk data, respondents 
generally thought it quite important that members of the group comport themselves well, with 
few responding that it is not at all important for members of the group to behave well (See Figure 
3.5). The median respondent had a score of .83 on this factor, indicating that she thought it more 
than very important that members of her group comported themselves well. Importantly, this set 
of questions had only a moderate bivariate correlation with the standard measure of 
authoritarianism (r=.27), suggesting that this measure captures something beyond individuals’ 
preference for good behavior, broadly construed.23  
Figure 3.5 about here 
In the multivariate context, we find, as displayed in Table 3.3, that scores on this factor 
correspond significantly with a number of relevant variables. Those who assigned greater 
importance to good behavior from within the group, as captured by responses to the three items 
that comprise this factor, tended to be older, scored higher on the authoritarianism battery, 
reported that religion was more important to their lives, and perceived greater discrimination 
toward members of their group. Scores on this factor, however, did not correspond with an 
endorsement of negative stereotypes about the group or with feelings of negative emotions like 
shame or embarrassment. Admittedly, these null findings present some initial challenges to my 
expectations that these particular items reflect identity-based concerns, as we would expect such 
concerns to map onto questions related to group-based shame and an endorsement of negative 
stereotypes about members of the group. These responses do not appear to have emerged 
randomly, however, as Blacks who perceived a more unequal racial landscape, as measured by 
                                                        
23 Recall, one item in the authoritarianism battery asks respondents whether it is more important 
that a child be considerate or well-behaved. The correlation between this item, which invokes 
good behavior, and Factor 1 is .16 and is significant at the 95 percent confidence level.   
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perceptions of discrimination, were more likely to think it important that members of the group 
properly comport themselves. This is an interesting result and one I return to later in the chapter. 
Table 3.3 about here 
Factor 2 Analyses: Factor 2, as the reader will recall, focuses on individuals’ sense that 
good behavior will lead to positive payoffs for the group as a whole. The pair of items that 
comprise this factor, RP4_DeserveEquality and RP5_TreatedBetter, had an inter-item 
correlation of .73 in the data. And, as Figure 3.6 shows, there was wide variation in scores on 
this factor. The median respondent had a median score of approximately .54, indicative of a 
moderate endorsement of the notion that good behavior and better treatment by society are linked 
with one another. Table 3.4 shows the results of a multivariate model predicting scores on this 
second factor. As we see, there were clear differences in the predictors of this factor, relative to 
Factor 1. 
Table 3.4 about here 
If these items capture the instrumental nature of respectability (i.e. good treatment stems 
from good behavior) as I suggest, we find no evidence here that these instrumental concerns 
differed among older and younger Blacks. Unsurprisingly, given this factor also deals with 
attitudes about behavior, we observe again that authoritarians scored higher on this factor, as did 
individuals for whom the racial identity was more important. Interestingly, there was no 
correspondence between linked fate and these instrumental concerns about behavior, which we 
might have expected given that linked fate asks individuals directly whether they believe that 
what happens to other Blacks will affect their own lives. I will make additional comments about 
how we might think about linked fate in this context when discussing the composite measure, but 
it may be the case that the role of linked fate is conditional on other considerations or that this 
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particular measure is too rough a proxy for a more valanced sense that the group bears the 
burden for the mistakes of the few. Again, I will return to a discussion of this possibility later in 
the chapter.  
Beyond these measures of identity, more religious Blacks scored higher on this factor and 
perceptions of discrimination weakly mapped onto lower scores. Again, these findings 
demonstrate the real challenge of this measurement exercise, as it could be the case that when 
asked about how important it is for Blacks to behave responsibly in public, increased perceptions 
of discrimination align with a sense that Blacks will be punished for stepping out of line. At the 
same time, when asked about the likelihood that society will treat Blacks better if they simply 
behave better, respondents who perceived more discrimination may have been more suspicious 
of this possibility. Perhaps most interestingly, there were strong and significant relationships 
between an endorsement of negative stereotypes about the group and feelings of group-based 
shame with a sense that good behavior would lead to better treatment.24 This makes sense, both 
theoretically and intuitively. Those who think the group is characterized more by negative traits 
or feel ashamed when they think about how the group is viewed by others likely center the 
responsibility for poor treatment by others in the behaviors and predilections of group members. 
And, consistent with this belief, are more likely to think that if members of the group simply 
adopt better behaviors, better treatment will logically follow. 
Focusing on the subscales is useful, as it allows us to get a clearer sense of how 
respondents are engaging these components of respectability that correlate with one another, but 
                                                        
24 Stereotype endorsement was measured by asking respondents how they would rate most 
members of the group on two separate items. One item asked respondents to place most Blacks 
on a non-violent—violent spectrum and the other asked them to place most Blacks on a lazy—
hardworking spectrum. The items were indexed together and scores were rescaled 0-1, with 
higher scores indicating a stronger endorsement of the negative stereotypes. 
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are empirically distinct. Theoretically, however, I expect these components work synchronously, 
such that individuals vary both in their general concern about the public behavior of Blacks and 
in their sense that good behavior has this instrumental payoff. With this theoretical expectation in 
mind, I indexed the two factors to construct a composite measure of respectability, which I refer 
to as the RPS. Variation in composite scores on this measure, I argue, are a better indication of 
individuals’ overall endorsement of respectability than variation in the scores of either of the two 
factors.2526 Looking at the overall distribution of the RPS in this sample displayed in Figure 3.7, 
we observe, as we did in the MTurk sample, a rightward skew, indicative of respondents’ general 
endorsement of the tenets of respectability, as measured by the composite scale.27 Consistent 
with this observation, the median respondent had a score on the RPS of .7, with scores 
standardized between 0 and 1. The weighted mean of the overall distribution was .68.  
These descriptive statistics suggest that respectability is not some fringe ideology in the 
Black community limited to Black elites or localized to very small pockets of the community. To 
the contrary, the politics of respectability appears a widely accepted worldview among Black 
Americans, with few rejecting in whole the belief set that sustains it. The vast majority of the 
sample thought it important that members of their group comport themselves well and agreed 
with the notion that good behavior from within the group is at least tenuously related to how the 
group fares in society. And importantly, the evidence does not support the idea that the RPS is 
                                                        
25 The five RPS items when indexed have a Cronbach’s alpha of .82. 
26 In this manuscript, I will present models where the composite measure is the key independent 
variable alongside sets of models where both factors are included. Such analyses will help us 
better understand whether this expectation holds in the data.   
27 Though fairly clear from the histogram presented in Figure 3.7, an empirical test of skewness 
and kurtosis relative to a normal distribution allows us to reject the null hypothesis that this scale 
has the properties of one that would be normally distributed.  
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simply a new measure of authoritarianism reconstructed. Though the RPS and the 
authoritarianism battery did correlate modestly (r=.36), the social, demographic, and 
psychological correlates are different, as we observe in this next set of analyses. 
Table 3.5 displays results from a multivariate model predicting scores on the RPS. Here 
again we find that older Blacks were more likely to score higher on the RPS, relative to their 
younger counterparts. This finding not only makes intuitive sense, as discussed earlier; the 
finding is consistent with recent qualitative work by Kerrison and colleagues (2018) that finds 
Black youth are rather suspicious of respectability’s efficacy, believing that irrespective of how 
they behave or how they comport themselves, they still find themselves susceptible to the 
dangerous power of the state. Though the values of respectability are often discussed as middle 
class or bourgeois values, there was no evidence here that income discriminates between those 
who were likely to embrace or reject the politics of respectability. This null finding is an 
important one, as it demonstrates that concerns about respectability are not particular to upper-
middle class Blacks but are concerns that find a home at both ends of the distribution.  
Table 3.5 about here 
Moreover, and again consistent with expectations, there was a strong relationship in the 
data between scores on the authoritarianism battery and scores on the RPS. Though it remains 
unclear precisely what the authoritarianism battery is capturing conceptually for Black 
respondents, Black respondents who placed greater value on those characteristics more aligned 
with what we standardly regard as authoritarian were more likely to embrace the politics of 
respectability. Again, this is not particularly surprising given respectability’s concern with 
behavior, but these analyses are the first to allow for an examination of the relationship between 
these concepts. In thinking about the politics of respectability, there is a tendency among 
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commentators to think of its adherents as individuals who are detached from their membership in 
the social group. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, this lay thinking does not align 
with what we know about many of the elite proponents of respectability who were often regarded 
as “race people” and who were outwardly quite concerned with the status of the racial group (see 
Gaines 2012). In these data, the evidence is consistent with this idea. Blacks who reported that 
their racial identity was more important to who they are were more likely to embrace the politics 
of respectability. We find no relationship, however, between linked fate or perceptions of 
discrimination and this measure of respectability. For reasons I discuss previously, I am not 
convinced that the relationship between these concepts and respectability is unconditional, and 
will discuss in brief the findings from a model that estimates the interactive relationship between 
perceptions of discrimination and linked fate with an endorsement of negative stereotypes about 
the group.  
To conclude analyses of this simple model, however, the more religious were more likely 
to embrace the politics of respectability, as were those who endorsed more negative stereotypes 
about the group and those who reported more frequent experiences of group-based shame or 
embarrassment. In light of these findings, there is strong suggestive evidence that the politics of 
respectability corresponds with emotional and ego-centric beliefs about the group, but the 
evidence is less compelling with respect to the role of instrumental considerations, as we would 
expect linked fate and perceptions of discrimination to matter much more if Blacks were 
concerned with the potential costs of bad behavior in deciding whether to embrace or reject the 
politics of respectability. 
The simple model presented in Table 3.5 is an additive model that assumes that each 
covariate independently corresponds with scores on the RPS. In thinking more about results of 
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this model, I wondered whether it was reasonable to expect that perceptions of discrimination 
and feelings of linked fate should have the unconditional relationship with respectability 
assumed by the model. With respect to linked fate and perceptions of discrimination, there are 
competing expectations about what the relationship between these concepts and respectability 
would be, depending on how one thinks about what the concepts imply. Again, one who 
perceives that there is much discrimination toward the group may place the blame for this 
discrimination on the group or may view it instead as stemming from an unequal social system 
for which Blacks bear little, if any, responsibility. Likewise, one who feels a great sense of 
linked fate with members of her racial group may regard this as beneficial or costly, depending 
on what she thinks about members of the group.  
With these possibilities in mind, I estimated another model, displayed in Table 3.6, that 
interacts perceptions of discrimination and linked fate with a measure of stereotype endorsement. 
The thinking here is that this measurement strategy ought to provide some theoretical clarity as 
to the relationship between these concepts and respectability, as those who differ in their 
embrace of negative stereotypes about the group also likely differ in their read of these 
instrumental considerations. The results are mostly consistent with the findings presented in 
Table 3.5, but interestingly we observe a strong and positive relationship between the interaction 
of perceptions of discrimination and stereotype endorsement and an embrace of respectability. 
Because the coefficients of these interactions can be difficult to interpret, I display the marginal 
effects in Figure 3.8.   
Table 3.6 about here 
Figure 3.8 about here 
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As we observe in Figure 3.8, among those who perceived low levels of discrimination 
toward the racial group (one standard deviation below the mean), endorsement of negative 
stereotypes about the group do not appear to bear on decisions to embrace or reject the politics of 
respectability. Among those who perceived a greater amount of discrimination toward the group 
(one standard deviation above the mean), a different pattern emerges. We observe among this set 
of respondents a divergence between individuals who endorsed more negative stereotypes about 
the group and those who rejected these stereotypes. Those who perceived a great deal of 
discrimination toward the group and who also endorsed more negative stereotypes about the 
group are likely individuals who simultaneously think the deck is stacked against Black 
Americans and also believe that Black people themselves are partially to blame for their lot. It 
therefore makes sense that these individuals more strongly embraced the politics of respectability 
relative to Blacks who perceived high levels of discrimination while rejecting more negative 
portrayals of their racial group. These results suggest that instrumental considerations do not 
uniformly affect individuals’ desire to correct the behavior of in-group members and that these 
considerations work alongside existing beliefs about group members. 
Is Respectability Just Authoritarianism? 
 
Beyond understanding what differentiates adherents of respectability from those who 
reject the worldview, it is important to distinguish the RPS from a measure of authoritarianism 
that on first view might be seen as capturing a similar construct. As the results of prior analyses 
demonstrate, the RPS and the child rearing battery thought to measure authoritarianism do share 
some common variance, but it is clear from the results presented in Table 3.7 that the correlates 
of authoritarianism differ from those of the RPS. With respect to the authoritarianism battery, we 
find, for example, no relationship with age, though age was a fairly strong predictor of scores on 
  64 
the RPS. We also find relationships between income, gender, party identification, and ideological 
self-identification, though none of these variables correspond with scores on the RPS. We do 
observe, consistent with findings regarding the RPS, that the more religious were more likely to 
endorse more authoritarian principles, but importantly find no relationship with authoritarianism 
and stereotype endorsement or feelings of group-based shame. These null results stand in stark 
contrast to the relationships we find between these psychological, group-relevant measures and 
the RPS. Given the modest relationship between the constructs and the apparent differences in 
predictors, I am confident that the RPS and the standard measure of authoritarianism are 
capturing different constructs, though again, all models predicting attitudes will include both 
measures. 
Table 3.7 about here 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the first measure of respectability, have discussed the 
psychometric features of the measure, and reported on its distribution, both in a convenience 
sample and in a more representative sample of Black Americans. Respectability, we find, has 
more than a few adherents, with a majority of both samples scoring above the midpoint on the 
Respectability Politics Scale. Using this measure, we are able to observe, for the first time, the 
correlates of respectability in a multivariate context, finding some support for the role of 
emotions and instrumental considerations in affecting the likelihood that individuals embrace or 
reject the politics of respectability. Further work is needed to more carefully refine the items to 
ensure that questions, particularly those related to Factor 1, are being read by respondents as 
intended, but analyses presented reveal that this initial measure shows great promise in helping 
capture variation in the attitudes regarding the politics of respectability. Importantly, this chapter 
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also demonstrates that this measure of respectability is not simply a rehashing of 
authoritarianism, as these measures appear to manifest from different lived experiences and 
considerations. In the next chapter, we will examine whether the Respectability Politics Scale, 
above and beyond existing measures, bears on the politics of Black Americans and their attitudes 
about punitive social policies. 
  
  66 
Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Piloted Items for RPS 
 Mean SD Min Max 
rp_avoidloud 0.44 0.36 0 1 
rp_inform 0.55 0.34 0 1 
rp_actrespinpub 0.72 0.28 0 1 
rp_groombeforepublic 0.59 0.35 0 1 
rp_avoidbaddress 0.37 0.35 0 1 
rp_hairstyles 0.19 0.29 0 1 
rp_behavefreely 0.57 0.33 0 1 
rp_setsbackk 0.48 0.32 0 1 
rp_carryselfrespect 0.68 0.32 0 1 
rp_punishforstereotypes 0.33 0.32 0 1 
rp_treatedbetter 0.45 0.32 0 1 
rp_takeresponsibility 0.72 0.26 0 1 
rp_didntworkhard 0.34 0.20 0 1 
rp_convincewhiteppleq 0.42 0.39 0 1 
rp_positiveimage 0.68 0.31 0 1 
rp_avoiddependency 0.49 0.34 0 1 
rp_blackleaders 0.68 0.30 0 1 
N 246    
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Table 3.2: Factor Loadings and Commonalities of Pilot Items 
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Uniqueness 
rp_avoidloud 0.11 0.59 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.22 0.48 
rp_inform 0.15 0.00 0.50 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.62 
rp_responsibly 0.73 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.20 -0.04 0.02 0.36 
rp_groomthemselves 0.47 0.22 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.20 -0.12 0.06 0.43 
rp_avoidbaddress 0.04 0.59 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.38 
rp_professionalhairstyles 0.04 0.36 0.06 -0.01 -0.15 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.67 
rp_behavefreely 0.00 -0.48 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.33 0.00 0.66 
rp_setsback 0.20 0.08 0.37 0.20 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.54 
rp_othersrespect 0.78 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.01 0.35 
rp_punishforstereotypes -0.10 0.16 0.51 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.68 
rp_treatedbetter 0.01 0.66 -0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 0.42 
rp_takeresponsibility 0.19 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.43 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.64 
rp_workharder -0.05 0.11 -0.06 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.75 
rp_deserveequality 0.10 0.67 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.14 -0.08 0.43 
rp_positiveimage 0.64 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.43 
rp_avoiddependency 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.29 -0.04 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.53 
rp_blackleaders 0.31 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.42 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.54 
Note: Based on principal factor analysis with oblique promax rotation of pilot items for the 
Respectability Politics Scale 
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Figure 3.1: Scree plot 
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Figure 3.2: Plot of Factor Loadings  
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Respectability Politics Scale in MTurk Study 
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Figure 3.4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of RPS in YouGov Study 
 
***p<.001 
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Factor 1 
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Table 3.3: Correlates of Factor 1 of the Respectability Politics Scale  
 b se  
Age 0.14 0.05 ** 
Education -0.04 0.05  
Income 0.01 0.04  
Female -0.01 0.02  
Party Id (Democrat) 0.05 0.05  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.04 0.04  
Authoritarianism 0.15 0.04 *** 
Racial Id Importance 0.04 0.04  
Linked Fate -0.04 0.03  
Importance of Religion to 
Life 0.12 0.03 *** 
Perceived Discrimination 0.17 0.05 *** 
Stereotype Endorsement -0.01 0.05  
Shame 0.05 0.04  
     Constant 0.38 0.07 *** 
N 466   
R-squared 0.18   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Factor 2 
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Table 3.4: Correlates of Factor 2 of the Respectability Politics Scale 
 b se  
Age 0.09 0.06  
Education 0.07 0.06  
Income -0.08 0.05  
Female -0.02 0.03  
Party Id (Democrat) -0.10 0.05  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.02 0.05  
Authoritarianism 0.27 0.05 *** 
Racial Id Importance 0.12 0.04 ** 
Linked Fate -0.02 0.03  
Importance of Religion to 
Life 0.11 0.04 ** 
Perceived Discrimination -0.10 0.06  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.25 0.06 *** 
Shame 0.12 0.04 ** 
     Constant 0.21 0.09 * 
N 466   
R-squared 0.22   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
  
  76 
Figure 3.7: Distribution of the RPS 
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Table 3.5: Correlates of the Respectability Politics Scale 
 b se  
Age 0.12 0.05 ** 
Education 0.01 0.05  
Income -0.03 0.04  
Female -0.01 0.02  
Party Id (Democrat) -0.01 0.04  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.03 0.04  
Authoritarianism 0.20 0.04 *** 
Racial Id Importance 0.08 0.03 * 
Linked Fate -0.03 0.03  
Importance of Religion to Life 0.12 0.03 *** 
Perceived Discrimination 0.06 0.05  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.10 0.05 * 
Shame 0.08 0.03 * 
     Constant 0.30 0.07 *** 
N 466   
R-squared 0.21   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3.6: Correlates of the Respectability Politics Scale with Interactions 
 b se  
Age 0.12 0.05 ** 
Education 0.01 0.05  
Income -0.03 0.04  
Female -0.01 0.02  
Party Id (Democrat) -0.01 0.04  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.02 0.04  
Authoritarianism 0.20 0.04 *** 
Racial Id Importance 0.07 0.03 * 
Linked Fate -0.10 0.05 * 
Stereotype Endorsement -0.43 0.16 ** 
Importance of Religion to Life -0.43 0.16 ** 
Linked Fate X Stereotype Endorsement 0.16 0.11  
Importance of Religion to Life 0.12 0.03 *** 
Perceived Discrimination -0.18 0.09  
Perceived Discrimination X Stereotype Endorsement 0.56 0.20 ** 
Shame 0.09 0.03 ** 
     Constant 0.52 0.09 *** 
N 466   
R-squared 0.24   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001    
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Figure 3.8: Model of RPS including Interactions 
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Table 3.7: Correlates of Authoritarianism 
 b se  
Age 0.03 0.06  
Education -0.19 0.06 ** 
Income -0.12 0.05 ** 
Female -0.07 0.02 ** 
Party Id (Democrat) 0.13 0.05 * 
Ideology (Liberal) -0.14 0.05 ** 
Racial Id Importance -0.02 0.04  
Linked Fate -0.05 0.03  
Importance of Religion to Life 0.26 0.04 *** 
Perceived Discrimination 0.05 0.06  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.04 0.06  
Shame -0.04 0.04  
     Constant 0.65 0.08 *** 
N 466   
R-squared 0.22   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Full Set of Respectability Politics Scale Pilot Items [Order randomized] 
 
Members of various groups hold a number of beliefs about how others members of the group 
should behave. We are interested in your thoughts about how other members of your racial group 
should behave. 
 
How important is that Black people avoid being unreasonably loud in public? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people inform other members of the group when they are 
acting irresponsibly? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people act responsibly in public? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people groom themselves appropriately before going into 
public? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people avoid styles of dress that reflect poorly on the racial 
group? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
If Black people want to succeed in America, how important is it that they maintain 
professional hairstyles in the workplace? For example, how important is it that Black 
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people avoid dreadlocks, braids, or uncommon natural hairstyles while on the job? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people have the freedom to behave however they want even 
if it means being judged negatively by other racial groups? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
When some Black people behave poorly, how much does it set the Black community back? 
None at all 
A little 
A moderate amount 
A lot 
A great deal 
 
How important is it that Black people carry themselves in ways that others will respect? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it for Black people to punish those members of the group who confirm 
negative stereotypes about the group? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How likely is it that Black people would be treated better by society if members of their 
racial group behaved better? 
Extremely unlikely 
Moderately unlikely 
Slightly unlikely 
Neither likely nor unlikely 
Slightly likely 
Moderately likely 
Extremely likely 
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How important is it for Black people to take responsibility for the way their lives turn out? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
When Black people don't succeed in life, how often is it because they didn't work hard 
enough? 
Never 
Sometimes 
About half the time 
Most of the time 
Always 
 
If Black people want to convince White people that they deserve equality, how important is 
it that members of the group behave better? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people behave in ways that contribute to a positive image of 
the group? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black people avoid the appearance of being too dependent on the 
government? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important 
 
How important is it that Black leaders talk more about the problems within the community 
caused by Black people themselves? 
Not at all important 
Slightly important 
Moderately important 
Very important 
Extremely important  
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 Chapter 4: Respectability and Black Attitudes toward Punitive Social Policies 
 
 
 In previous chapters, we have focused on the politics of respectability as a concept deeply 
rooted in the history of race in the United States. Respectability, I have argued, is not merely an 
ancillary feature of Black life in America that takes hold among the fringes of this diverse 
community. As the results presented in Chapter 3 make clear, it is instead a popular worldview 
embraced by many within the Black community. The concerns that respectability engenders 
regarding comportment, public image, and behavior are concerns that manifest across various 
lines of division. When asked to respond to items that capture their own embrace of 
respectability, respondents vary in the strength of their endorsement, but few fully reject the 
politics of respectability.  
The burden remains, however, to demonstrate that respectability, separate and apart from 
existing constructs, contributes meaningfully to our understanding of heterogeneity in Black 
public opinion. More specifically, given the theoretical framework introduced at the outset, it 
remains to be seen whether and, if so, to what extent respectability shapes Black attitudes toward 
punitive social policies that bear on the lives of Black Americans. 
 In thinking about the politics of punishment among Black Americans, our empirical work 
has failed to keep pace with what we know about Black attitudes in this domain. As discussed in 
previous chapters, we know, for example, that a significant subset of Black Americans favors 
capital punishment, despite the disparate impact the death penalty has on the lives of Black men 
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in America. We know, similarly, from the work of various scholars, that this is not an aberration. 
Support within the Black community for the war on drugs and other policies that gave rise to 
America’s system of mass incarceration is well documented (Alexander 2012; Forman Jr 2017b; 
Fortner 2015). Beyond this observed heterogeneity in Black attitudes toward criminal justice 
policies, we observe, too, diversity in attitudes toward policies related to the state’s provision of 
social services and in individuals’ judgments about how paternalistic the state ought to be toward 
those who receive its benefits (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008). With few notable exceptions, 
however, the extant literature provides little insight into the kinds of considerations that shape 
Black attitudes toward these kinds of racialized punitive social policies, focusing instead on 
exploiting variation in White attitudes about the same.  
 The argument advanced in this dissertation is straightforward. To understand Black 
attitudes regarding punitive social policies perceived to target the in-group, we must attend to the 
kinds of group-based considerations that likely undergird attitudes of this type. In adopting a 
group-centric approach to understanding variation in these domains, this work is in keeping with 
an approach that acknowledges the group-centric nature of American politics (see Nelson and 
Kinder 1996, for example). More than that, this approach acknowledges the need to think 
carefully about the kinds of considerations that may uniquely motivate responses to those who 
share in a salient social identity. Whereas the existing literature focuses primarily on those 
factors that shape the attitudes of dominant group members toward policies perceived to target 
members of other, more subjugated groups, the analyses in this chapter are concerned with 
examining how members of the target group come to think about the same class of issues. 
To reiterate, the theoretical framework that guides the analyses in this chapter expects 
that Blacks vary in their concern about the behavior of in-group members and, likewise, hold 
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differing views regarding the connection between the group’s behavior and the group’s status in 
society. These views are collectively captured using the Respectability Politics Scale, the 
measure introduced in the previous chapter. Again, scores on this measure distinguish between 
individuals who reject and accept the politics of respectability. Those with lower cumulative 
scores on the measure are less concerned about the behavior of in-group members and are less 
likely than higher scoring individuals to believe that treatment of the group will improve if 
members of the group behave better. Variation in respectability measures, therefore, is expected 
to correspond with variation in attitudes toward punitive policies perceived to correct or stave off 
certain kinds of behavior, particularly behavior that aligns with negative stereotypes about the 
group. This modeling approach, which takes advantage of a multivariate empirical framework, 
allows us to place the politics of respectability in direct contention with existing concepts.  
Though I will refrain from going through, once again, a list of these concepts, I want to 
restate here that the empirical bar is a high one for the politics of respectability to overcome.28 
Variation in a range of factors could likely explain variation in our outcomes of interest—
outcomes that focus principally on individuals’ beliefs about racialized punitive social policies. 
In a standard American politics framework, we would look first to variation in partisanship or 
ideology as chief predictors of how individuals may come to think about these and other policies. 
Importantly, too, the RPS in the multivariate context, will have to contend with the possible 
influence of other familiar constructs like linked fate, which occupies a central role in much of 
our theorizing to date about Black politics. Both conceptually and empirically, linked fate and 
the Black Utility Heuristic, for which linked fate serves as an operational proxy, are key players 
in any work seeking to make sense of variations in the attitudes of Black Americans. In the 
                                                        
28 See Chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion. 
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domain of Black politics research, few concepts emerge with greater star power. And finally, in 
the multivariate context, we can examine whether respectability gives us purchase beyond some 
more general concerns about behavior, which ought to be captured by something like 
authoritarianism. In short, the analyses presented in this chapter will put respectability to a 
difficult test, pitting it against a range of constructs thought to explain Americans’ political 
attitudes in general (e.g. partisanship and ideology) and Black attitudes in particular (e.g. linked 
fate and identity centrality). As the results presented in the following pages will show, the RPS 
passes this initial test. 
Beyond the multivariate analyses that will help demonstrate the meaningfulness of the 
RPS as a measure and of respectability as a construct, I also detail some results from a survey 
experiment that provides some insight into the constraints of the measures. In particular, the 
experimental analyses examine whether the RPS is differentially meted out in response to in-
group members’ behavior relative to those outside the group. As discussed in the existing 
literature, and as I theorize it here, the influence of respectability should be most pronounced in 
judgments that implicate members of the in-group, particularly considering the fact that 
respectability corresponds, at least to some degree, with self-conscious emotions like shame and 
embarrassment. For the sake of clarity, I will discuss the experimental set up used to test this 
expectation later in the chapter before discussing the results of the experiment. To preview the 
findings, however, the experimental results suggest a need to either further refine the measure or 
to extend our thinking about the scope conditions of respectability as a construct. I will provide 
some initial thoughts on the implications of these results at the end of the chapter, but return to 
this discussion in the concluding chapter.  
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First, let us focus our attention on the multivariate analyses that deal in turn with Black 
respondents’ attitudes toward a range of punitive social policies. Again, the theoretical 
expectation guiding these analyses is rather straightforward. I expect that Blacks who more 
strongly endorse the politics of respectability will be more likely to support punitive social 
policies. Insofar as members of the group vary in their embrace of the politics of respectability—
which we find relates to variations in authoritarianism, shame, and an endorsement of negative 
stereotypes about the group—they should also differ in their propensity to support punitive social 
policies meant to correct or punish “bad behavior” that deviates from norms of thrift, hard-work, 
modesty, respect for the law, etc. 
 To conclude that the politics of respectability is a meaningful construct that structures 
Black attitudes, the relationship between these attitudes and the RPS must persist even when 
considering potential alternative explanations related to partisanship (or partisan strength), 
ideology, linked fate, and an endorsement of negative in-group stereotypes. Importantly, the 
relationship must also hold after accounting for authoritarianism, which I regard here as a 
broader, more general attitude about behavior. As the evidence presented will show, the RPS 
meets this high burden across the set of items I examine, explaining variation in outcomes above 
and beyond these more familiar constructs. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data presented here is drawn from the July 2017 YouGov study described in the 
previous chapter. Recall that this data includes 500 Black respondents, and though the data are 
not drawn from a probability sample, respondents vary significantly in socioeconomic status, 
education, regional and religious background. Moreover, and importantly, there is heterogeneity 
across the set of outcomes. Again, the set of outcomes selected are intended to represent a range 
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of punitive social policies that bear disproportionately on the lives of Black Americans. 
Alongside these policy items are other questions that ought to align with attitudes regarding 
respectability, such as questions that ask individuals to assign structural or individual blame for 
the presence of gangs in American cities. In an effort to closely examine the measure of 
respectability introduced in the dissertation, I present two separate models for each outcome. The 
primary model of interest is the model that regresses the full RPS measure—the five-item 
measure—on the outcomes of interest. A second model is then estimated that examines the 
influence of the two individual factors that comprise the RPS. The reader will recall that the first 
factor includes three items that focus on individuals’ sense of how important it is that Blacks 
behave responsibly in public, that they carry themselves in ways that others will respect, and 
behave in ways that contribute to a positive image of the group. The second factor includes two 
additional items that gauge respondents’ sense that Blacks would be treated better by society and 
stand a better chance of convincing Whites that they deserve equality if the members of the 
group behaved better. All models include demographic controls, political covariates, and a set of 
potential confounders, chief among which is a measure of authoritarianism. Because these policy 
questions were asked after the experimental manipulation, I also include an experimental control 
in each of the models. For ease of interpretation, all variables are scaled between 0 and 1.   
 
Results 
 
Let us begin first with the policy discussed at the outset: support for sagging pants 
ordinances.29 Among Blacks in the sample, 24 percent opposed these ordinances, though 54 
percent of respondents expressed support for fining those who sagged their pants in public. The 
                                                        
29 Full question wordings for all outcomes used in analyses included in Appendix E. 
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remainder, nearly 22 percent of respondents, reported that they neither supported nor opposed 
this measure. Looking at Table 4.1, we observe that scores on the RPS strongly correspond with 
attitudes toward sagging pants ordinances, above and beyond the influence of other covariates in 
the model. More specifically, respondents one standard deviation above and below the mean on 
the RPS differ by nearly 17 percentage points in their support for sagging pants ordinances 
(p<.001). When we pit Factor 1 and Factor 2 against one another in a second model, we observe 
that Factor 1—the items about the importance of good behavior in view of others—is strongly 
related to attitudes about sagging pants ordinances (p<.001), though Factor 2, comprised of the 
items about how Blacks would fare if they behaved better, is not significantly related to these 
attitudes.  
Table 4.1 about here 
 
Turning our attention next to attitudes about bans on certain hairstyles in the U.S. 
military, such as braids, dreads, and other natural hairstyles, we do not find that scores on the 
RPS contribute significantly to individuals’ beliefs about this controversial policy. Again, there 
is much variation in opinion about this policy, but it is much less popular than fines for sagging 
pants. Whereas the majority of Black respondents support fining those who sag their pants in 
public, the majority of respondents oppose banning Black hairstyles in the U.S. military. 
Interestingly, perceptions of discrimination and gender are powerful predictors of attitudes 
toward these bans, with women and those who perceive greater discrimination toward Blacks 
more likely to oppose these bans, ceteris paribus. Looking at the exploratory model where the 
two factors are included as separate covariates, we continue to observe the influence of gender 
and perceptions of discrimination, but a puzzling pattern emerges with respect to the two factors. 
Those who score higher on the Factor 1 are less likely to support bans on these hairstyles, though 
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higher scores on Factor 2 correspond with more support. Because I did not expect these patterns 
to emerge in the data, I want to be careful in drawing too much of an inference from them, but 
my initial reaction, based on the other findings in the model, is that Blacks who serve in the 
armed services are likely already regarded by their in-group members as respectable individuals. 
Because they are already viewed as upstanding members of the group, policing their hairstyles 
may seem unnecessary or even counterproductive to some. The strong and positive relationship 
between the second factor and attitudes about this policy, however, suggest that those who 
believe that Blacks are engaged in some kind of quid pro quo when it comes to equality, are 
more willing to restrict certain hairstyles among these individuals (p<.01). 
Table 4.2 about here 
 
With respect to beliefs about how much the government should help a woman in one’s 
community who contracts a sexually transmitted disease after having sex with multiple partners, 
I find no evidence that the RPS or that the individual factors explain responses to this question. I 
included the item to examine whether the measure might help us understand Black attitudes 
toward seemingly promiscuous behavior among members of the group, but at least in this 
context, the measure does not discriminate. It is perhaps the case that this particular 
manifestation of sexual promiscuity (contracting a sexually transmitted disease after having sex 
with multiple people) does not evoke in individuals concerns about out-group judgments, as this 
may be viewed more as a private matter. It could also be the case that while I hoped that “a 
woman in your community” would cue respondents to think about those who belong to their own 
racial group, a more explicit mention of race may have been necessary to have respondents make 
that connection. Here, on this question about how much help the government ought to provide—
a clearly partisan question—we observe that partisanship and ideology emerge as key predictors, 
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with those more strongly attached to the Democratic Party and self-identifying liberals more 
likely to say the government should provide more help.  
 
Table 4.3 about here 
 
Though it is typical to ask individuals about the distribution of welfare subsidies, I ask 
here about individuals’ beliefs regarding work requirements for welfare recipients. Given the 
standard portrayal of welfare recipients as undeserving and Black (Gilens 1999), the expectation 
is that these individuals will be viewed by other in-group members as threatening to the groups 
image, thereby eliciting the kind of punitive responses respectability engenders. As the results 
presented in Table 4.4 demonstrate, this expectation is borne out in the data. Individuals at either 
end of the RPS differ in their support for requiring welfare recipients to work (p<.001). An 
individual who wholly rejects the politics of respectability is likely to respond that it is only 
slightly important that welfare recipients be required to work or volunteer while receiving the 
benefit, while an individual at the other end of the RPS is likely to respond that such a 
requirement is very important. And when we separate out the two factors, we find that both of 
them positively and significantly correspond with support for this requirement.30 
 
Table 4.4 about here  
 
We similarly observe that the full RPS and the two factors independently correspond with 
Black support for broken windows style policies (i.e. law enforcement stopping individuals who 
loiter, trespass, or are engaged in disorderly conduct in public). When asked about support for 
harsher penalties for those found in possession of illegal drugs, respondents who score higher on 
                                                        
30 In pilot studies, I also explored whether the RPS corresponded with beliefs about whether 
funding should be increased for welfare or food stamps and find no significant relationship. This 
finding about the policing of recipients, however, is consistent across studies. 
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the RPS are also more likely to support these harsher penalties (p<.001), though the 
supplemental model suggests that the second factor is driving these results.  
Table 4.5 about here 
 
Table 4.6 about here 
 
In line with suggestions that elites like Bill Cosby and Barack Obama were engaged in 
the politics of respectability when they scolded Black audiences for the behavior of in-group 
members, we also find that those who more strongly embrace the politics of respectability are 
more likely to blame poor parenting and hip-hop culture for the presence of gangs in American 
cities than failing schools or the lack of economic opportunities in these places (p<.001). Those 
high in respectability are also more supportive of corporal punishment in the home (p<.01), 
though we observe that the Factor 1 items about the importance of Blacks behaving well in 
public appear to correspond more strongly than the items about equality, which comprise Factor 
2. This finding may align with qualitative work that suggests Black parents who use corporal 
punishment with their children worry about the negative consequences that will befall them if 
they misbehave (C. A. Taylor, Hamvas, and Paris 2011). 
Table 4.7 about here 
 
Table 4.8 about here 
 
In 2015, riots broke out in Baltimore Maryland following the death of Freddie Gray, a 
Black man, in police custody. Several individuals involved in these riots were arrested. Many 
were teenagers. In this study, I asked respondents how much sympathy they had for those 
teenagers arrested in Baltimore who had engaged in riotous behavior following the death of 
Freddie Gray. Falling short of statistical significance, scores on the full RPS, do negatively 
correspond with reports of sympathy for these teenagers (p<.10). That is, those who score higher 
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on the RPS report less sympathy for those arrested, though again this finding is not statistically 
significant. Importantly, however, we do observe that when the influence of the two factors is 
estimated separately, the second factor is significantly related to lower levels of sympathy for 
these teenagers (p<.05). This finding makes sense theoretically, as this behavior conducted in 
public view could be viewed as threatening to the very cause for which these teenagers 
advocated, particularly among those who scored high on this second factor.  
Table 4.9 about here 
 
Finally, I was interested in examining whether variation in Blacks’ embrace of 
respectability corresponded with their attitudes toward the death penalty, a policy that 
disproportionately bears on the lives of Black Americans. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, the RPS strongly predicts support for the death penalty (p<.001). Ceteris paribus, 
respondents who score one deviation above and below the mean on the RPS differ by 11 
percentage points in their support of the death penalty. Again, these findings persist above and 
beyond standard measures of partisan and group attachment and, importantly, persist in the 
presence of authoritarianism, which fails to even achieve statistical significance in the model. In 
the model in which factors 1 and 2 are included separately, we observe that individuals who 
score higher on the second factor are more likely to support the death penalty, whereas the first 
factor fails to achieve statistical significance.  
Table 4.10 about here 
 
Respectability and Policing of In-Group vs. Out-Group Behavior 
 
Now that we have demonstrated that respectability powerfully corresponds with a set of 
punitive social policies, I wanted to test whether respectability differentially predicted responses 
to measures clearly targeted at the in-group relative to the out-group. The correspondence 
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between the RPS and in-group directed emotions like shame and group-relevant stereotypes 
suggest that respondents are, in fact, thinking about the in-group when they respond to the 
battery of questions that form the RPS, but I wanted a clear test of whether the measure’s 
influence was constrained to in-group members. This can be considered in some respects a test of 
the measure’s discriminant validity, at least if we assume that the measure ought to correspond 
with in-group behavior and not with responses to behavior that concerns out-group members. 
As you may recall, respondents in the YouGov study were randomly assigned to one of 
two treatment conditions and exposed to six scenarios that either involved Black individuals or 
members of another target group. They were then asked to render a judgment about either the 
appropriateness of a policy (e.g. school dress codes), some behavior (e.g. protests at political 
rallies), or some punishment (e.g. life imprisonment under a state’s three-strikes law). 31 Because 
we are interested in whether the measure is differentially predictive of measures targeting the in-
group versus those targeting the out-group, I estimate a model in which I interact respondents’ 
condition (i.e. Black scenarios or non-Black scenarios) with respectability to predict the 
outcome. Respondents are coded 0 if they are in the non-Black scenarios condition and 1 if they 
are in the Black scenarios condition. For each outcome, a significant coefficient on the 
interaction would suggest that those who score higher or lower on the RPS respond differently 
when the target is a member of the out-group than they do when the target is a member of the in-
group.  A non-significant coefficient on the interaction suggests that an individual who scores 
high or low on the RPS is as punitive when the target is a member of the out-group as they are 
when the target is a member of the in-group. That is a test of the measure’s discriminant validity, 
but we can also examine the extent to which the measure is more or less predictive within both 
                                                        
31 A full listing of the scenarios included is in the chapter appendix. 
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conditions. The graphic renderings of the results will allow us to examine both of these 
possibilities. In line with the analyses presented in the previous section, I also explore this 
expectation with respect to the two factors, considered separately. 
At the risk of overwhelming the reader, I present a number of figures in the section below, 
but for clarity, let me describe in broad strokes the patterns that emerge. Contrary to my 
expectations, the RPS appears to bear on judgments that target non-Black subjects, just as it does 
when the target is Black. There are some exceptions that I discuss in detail, but the RPS 
discriminates more than I thought it would for non-Black scenarios. We observe similar patterns 
with respect to the first factor—the items that pertain to individuals’ sense of the importance of 
Blacks behaving well in public. The second factor appears to discriminate the most between 
responses in the non-Black and Black scenarios, though results are mixed, as we will see in the 
set of figures presented throughout this section. Because these results likely provide some of the 
more useful information as I think about refining the measure of respectability and as I consider 
the conditions under which the underlying motivations inspire more punitive responses, I will 
discuss the results of each scenario in some detail before concluding with some thoughts about 
what these experimental results, coupled with the results of the multivariate analyses, suggest 
moving forward. 
 
Black Lives Matter Protests and Planned Parenthood Protests 
Let us look first at responses to the scenario in which participants are told either that Black 
Lives Matter protestors or Planned Parenthood protestors have been interrupting campaign 
events. Respondents are asked how appropriate it was for protestors to use this tactic of 
interrupting to advocate for their position. As we observe in Figure 4.1a, individuals who score 
high on the RPS are as likely to say that the planned parenthood protest interruptions were 
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inappropriate as they are to say that the BLM interruptions were inappropriate. Similarly, those 
who score low on the RPS do not differ by condition, either. Looking at Figure 4.1a, we can see 
that the “Low Respectability” confidence intervals overlap in the two conditions, suggesting 
again that the RPS is not differentially affecting levels of punitiveness between the two 
conditions. We do observe, however, that whereas the RPS does not explain variation in the non-
Black Planned Parenthood condition (i.e. overlap between those low and high in respectability), 
the RPS does significantly distinguish responses in the Black Lives Matter condition. In Figure 
4.1b, we observe first that scores on the first factor explain variation in both conditions. That is, 
respondents in both conditions are equally punitive, depending on whether they are high or low 
scorers on this factor. In Figure 4.2c, we see that the second factor, which measures individuals’ 
beliefs that good behavior from within the group will lead to better treatment by society, does not 
explain variation in either condition, nor does it distinguish responses between the two 
conditions.  
Figures 4.1a-4.1c about here 
 
Life Imprisonment for Jack Pendleton or DeMarcus Jacobs based on Three-Strikes Law 
 In this scenario, respondents are told that a 25-year-old White or Black man has engaged 
in a string of robberies in a wealthy suburb and that the case was recently featured on the local 
news. If he is convicted under the state’s three-strikes law, he could face life imprisonment. 
Respondents are asked how reasonable or unreasonable such a sentence would be. Here, we 
observe that the coefficient on the interaction is significant at p=0.06. Taking a look at Figure 
4.2a will help us make sense of the differences that emerge. Here, observe that Blacks who score 
low on the RPS are much less likely to think that a life sentence is appropriate for DeMarcus 
than they are to think it is appropriate for Jack. Those high in respectability, however, are equally 
punitive toward Jack and DeMarcus. And whereas the RPS fails to explain variation in perceived 
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appropriateness of a life sentence for Jack, the measure strongly corresponds to attitudes when 
the punishment is targeted toward DeMarcus, the in-group member. The first factor again fails 
both tests. It neither distinguishes between the conditions, nor does it explain variation within 
(see Figure 4.2b). Factor 2, on the other hand, behaves much like the full RPS, with similar 
patterns emerging in the data (see Figure 4.2c). In this particular scenario, Black respondents 
who reject the politics of respectability are much more willing to cut DeMarcus a break than 
those who embrace respectability, as measured either by the full RPS or by responses to the 
second factor, which captures this more instrumental arm of the construct. Though we should be 
cautious in drawing too strong a conclusion from this one scenario, this finding seems to suggest 
that there are conditions under which respectability is localized to members of the in-group. 
Figuring out precisely what those conditions are requires additional study and testing. 
Figures 4.2a-4.2c about here 
 
Importance of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients when Whites or Blacks more likely to Use 
Drugs 
 When asked about the importance of drug testing welfare recipients after being told that 
White or Black recipients are more likely to use drugs, we see again that the RPS is predictive in 
both conditions. We observe, too, that individuals who score low on the second factor are most 
lenient toward members of their in-group, relative to all other individuals.  
 
Figures 4.3a-4.3c about here 
 
Importance of Hispanic Students Avoiding use of Spanish or Black Students Avoiding use 
of Ebonics 
 In this scenario, respondents were asked how important it is for Hispanic students to 
avoid using Spanish or how important it is for Black students to avoid using Ebonics at school. 
As the figures below show, the RPS and the individual factors explain variation in attitudes in 
both conditions. Consistently, however, high scoring individuals thought it most important that 
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the Black students avoid using Ebonics. The gap between low and high scoring individuals in 
each of the conditions, too, is different, as Black respondents at either end of the poles disagree 
most when asked about Black students using Ebonics. This discrepancy is most apparent with 
respect to the second factor, though it maintains across the three models and even emerges when 
factor 1 scores are considered. If that first factor is, as results from the previous chapter suggest, 
reflective of both individuals’ concerns about the group and their sense of what might happen 
when in-group members step out of line, it makes sense that Blacks who score high on this factor 
think it important that Black students use proper English, lest they face negative consequences 
brought about by their place in a society that fails to treat them equally. Moreover, the use of 
Ebonics in public might be viewed as posing a threat to the group’s image or may be seen as 
reinforcing negative stereotypes about the group’s levels of intelligence or their fitness for full 
integration into society.  
 
Figures 4.4a-4.4c about here 
 
Reasonableness of Strict Dress Code in Black or Hispanic Schools 
Similar to the previous scenario, this scenario asked respondents about the reasonableness of 
a strict dress code policy implemented in a school described as predominantly Black or 
predominantly Hispanic. I will not walk through each of the figures, but want to draw the 
reader’s attention to Figure 4.5c in this set. Here, we observe that Factor 2 once again fails to 
explain variation in the condition where the school is described as predominantly Hispanic, 
though it does significantly predict responses in the condition where the school is described as 
Black, suggesting that it has a level of discriminant validity that is lacking for both the full RPS 
and the first factor. I will return to this point in the concluding remarks of this chapter. 
Figures 4.5a-4.5c about here 
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Appropriateness of Arresting Connor or Jamal 
In the final scenario, respondents are asked about the appropriateness of arresting a White 
man or a Black man following a discourteous interaction they had with a police officer who 
stopped them on their way to work for driving too quickly in a school zone. Here, we observe a 
set of somewhat puzzling findings. For example, in Figure 4.6a, respondents who score highest 
on the RPS are most punitive toward Connor, and we do not observe the patterns we would 
expect to observe in the other figures if the measure was discriminating in line with our 
theoretical expectations. There is perhaps some story to be told that individuals high in 
respectability in the Connor condition imagine that a Black person who spoke to the officer in 
the way Connor is described to have spoken to him would be held to account and, therefore, this 
White guy should be as well. That story requires more of a theoretical leap than I prefer, but it is 
instructive as I think more carefully about how contextual factors may influence the kind of 
judgments individuals make both about the behavior of in-group members and out-group 
members. 
Figures 4.6a-4.6c about here 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to present a transparent portrait of the Respectability Politics 
Scale’s influence on the attitudes of Black Americans. In an effort to more clearly understand the 
cumulative measure and its constitutive parts, I also examined the meaningfulness of the two 
factors in explaining variation in these attitudes as well. The results of the multivariate analyses 
are striking. We find, even after accounting for partisanship, ideology, authoritarianism, and 
measures of group identification, that this novel measure of respectability uniquely explains 
variation in opinion toward a range of policy questions. We find, for example, that those who 
more strongly embrace the politics of respectability are more likely to support harsher sentencing 
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for those found in possession of illegal drugs. They are similarly more likely to support policies 
like sagging pants ordinances, work requirements for welfare beneficiaries, broken windows 
policies that allow law enforcement officers to have more frequent contact with citizens, and are 
much more likely than those who reject the politics of respectability to support the death penalty, 
a policy that disproportionately affect Black people in the United States. There are, to be sure, 
cases in which the RPS does not appear to influence judgments, as we observe when we consider 
attitudes about military bans on certain hairstyles.  
 A deeper dive into the analyses that considers the influence of the two factors that 
comprise the RPS when pitted against each other provides mixed results. Coupled with the 
experimental results, there is a clear need to further interrogate the conditions under which the 
kinds of considerations proxied for by the two factors are most likely to influence individuals’ 
judgments. As I note previously, my sense in developing the RPS was that the first factor would 
proxy for the kinds of ego-centric concerns that align with thoughts about threats to the group’s 
image, and by extension, threats to one’s own sense of self. The findings of this chapter paired 
with the findings of the previous chapter, give me greater confidence that the importance items 
that comprise Factor 1 most closely reflect individuals’ sense that the world is an unequal place 
for Black people and that, as a result, it is important that Black people behave well. The word 
important seems to be doing a lot of the work in these items—more than I had thought 
previously. As a result, the RPS appears noisier than I would prefer. There is still much to gain 
from these analyses, however. We observe, for example, a number of cases where the second 
factor, which gets at the core of respectability politics—the sense that the lot of Black people 
would improve if they simply behaved better—corresponds with several outcomes of interest and 
behaves as we would expect in the discriminant analyses made possible by the experiment. There 
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is, to be sure, more work to be done to refine the RPS to ensure that it is capturing as clearly and 
efficiently the construct under consideration, but the findings of this chapter go a long way in 
laying the ground work for the additional theoretical and empirical work that is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
 In the next chapter, I introduce one final experiment that returns to a question I raise 
throughout the dissertation: is the motivation to punish in-group members principally a response 
to negative psychological emotions brought about by bad behavior or the consequence of 
concerns that bad behavior will lead to negative real-life consequences for the group.  
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Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Support for Sagging Pants Fines 
 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS   Model 2: RPS Factors  
 b se   b se   
Respectability 0.36 0.07 ***      
Authoritarianism 0.19 0.06 **  0.19 0.06 ***  
Party ID (Democrat) -0.03 0.07   -0.04 0.07   
Ideology (Liberal) -0.02 0.06   -0.01 0.06   
Racial ID. Importance -0.03 0.05   -0.03 0.05   
Linked Fate -0.06 0.04   -0.06 0.04   
Discrimination toward Blacks 0.13 0.07   0.11 0.07   
Stereotype Endorsement 0.06 0.07   0.08 0.07   
Age 0.25 0.07 ***  0.25 0.07 ***  
Education -0.12 0.08   -0.11 0.08   
Income 0.07 0.06   0.06 0.06   
Female 0.05 0.03   0.05 0.03   
Experimental Condition -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03   
RPS Factor 1     0.29 0.07 ***  
RPS Factor 2     0.08 0.06   
     Constant 0.10 0.10   0.08 0.10   
N 470    470    
R-squared 0.18    0.18    
^p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.2: Reasonableness of Military Hair Bans  
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.00 0.07      
Authoritarianism -0.01 0.06   -0.02 0.06  
Party ID (Democrat) -0.12 0.07   -0.09 0.07  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.05 0.07   -0.06 0.07  
Racial ID. Importance -0.07 0.06   -0.08 0.05  
Linked Fate 0.11 0.04 *  0.10 0.04 * 
Discrimination toward Blacks -0.27 0.08 **  -0.21 0.08 ** 
Stereotype Endorsement 0.09 0.07   0.04 0.07  
Age 0.38 0.07 ***  0.39 0.07 *** 
Education 0.03 0.08   0.01 0.08  
Income -0.02 0.06   0.00 0.06  
Female -0.14 0.03 **  -0.13 0.03 *** 
Experimental Condition -0.04 0.03   -0.05 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     -0.23 0.08 ** 
RPS Factor 2     0.20 0.06 ** 
     Constant 0.66 0.11 ***  0.70 0.11 *** 
N 474    474   
R-squared 0.15    0.17   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.3: How Much Help to Provide Woman with STD 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.00 0.07      
Authoritarianism -0.05 0.05   -0.05 0.05  
Party ID (Democrat) 0.20 0.06 **  0.20 0.06 ** 
Ideology (Liberal) 0.19 0.06 **  0.19 0.06 ** 
Racial ID. Importance 0.06 0.05   0.06 0.05  
Linked Fate 0.00 0.04   0.00 0.04  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks 0.12 0.07   0.12 0.07  
Stereotype Endorsement -0.03 0.07   -0.03 0.07  
Age 0.18 0.07 **  0.18 0.07 ** 
Education 0.15 0.07 *  0.15 0.07 * 
Income -0.17 0.05 **  -0.17 0.05 ** 
Female -0.02 0.03   -0.02 0.03  
Experimental Condition -0.02 0.03   -0.02 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     0.00 0.07  
RPS Factor 2     0.00 0.06  
     Constant 0.17 0.10   0.17 0.10  
N 471    471   
R-squared 0.14    0.14   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.4: Importance of Work Requirements for Welfare Recipients 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.48 0.07 ***     
Authoritarianism 0.02 0.06   0.03 0.06  
Party ID (Democrat) -0.01 0.06   -0.02 0.06  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.09 0.06   -0.09 0.06  
Racial ID. Importance -0.06 0.05   -0.06 0.05  
Linked Fate -0.06 0.04   -0.06 0.04  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks 0.02 0.07   0.02 0.07  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.05 0.07   0.06 0.07  
Age 0.00 0.07   0.00 0.07  
Education -0.06 0.07   -0.05 0.07  
Income 0.20 0.06 ***  0.20 0.06 *** 
Female 0.01 0.03   0.01 0.03  
Experimental Condition -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     0.29 0.07 *** 
RPS Factor 2     0.19 0.06 ** 
     Constant 0.29 0.10 **  0.28 0.10 ** 
N 470    470   
R-squared 0.16    0.16   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.5: Importance of Stopping Individuals Loitering, Trespassing, Engaged in Disorderly 
Conduct in Public  
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.38 0.06 ***     
Authoritarianism 0.11 0.05 *  0.11 0.05 * 
Party ID (Democrat) -0.01 0.05   -0.01 0.05  
Ideology (Liberal) 0.08 0.05   0.08 0.05  
Racial ID. Importance 0.12 0.04 **  0.12 0.04 ** 
Linked Fate 0.00 0.03   0.00 0.03  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks -0.10 0.06   -0.11 0.06  
Stereotype Endorsement -0.01 0.05   0.00 0.06  
Age 0.08 0.06   0.08 0.06  
Education -0.22 0.06 **  -0.22 0.06 ** 
Income 0.17 0.05 ***  0.17 0.05 *** 
Female 0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02  
Experimental Condition -0.03 0.02   -0.03 0.02  
RPS Factor 1     0.25 0.06 *** 
RPS Factor 2     0.13 0.05 ** 
     Constant 0.22 0.08 **  0.21 0.08 * 
N 471    471   
R-squared 0.22    0.22   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.6: Support for Harsher Drug Sentencing 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.29 0.06 ***     
Authoritarianism 0.13 0.05 *  0.12 0.05 * 
Party ID (Democrat) 0.00 0.06   0.03 0.06  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.11 0.06 *  -0.12 0.06 * 
Racial ID. Importance 0.00 0.05   -0.01 0.05  
Linked Fate -0.03 0.04   -0.04 0.04  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks -0.10 0.06   -0.05 0.07  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.06 0.06   0.02 0.06  
Age 0.10 0.06   0.12 0.06  
Education -0.10 0.07   -0.11 0.07  
Income 0.14 0.05 **  0.15 0.05 ** 
Female 0.05 0.03   0.05 0.03 * 
Experimental Condition -0.03 0.03   -0.04 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     0.02 0.07  
RPS Factor 2     0.27 0.05 *** 
     Constant 0.21 0.09 *  0.23 0.09 * 
N 469    469   
R-squared 0.15    0.17   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.7: Belief that Causes of Gangs in American Cities More Result of Personal and Cultural 
versus Structural Explanations 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.16 0.03 ***     
Authoritarianism 0.03 0.03   0.02 0.03  
Party ID (Democrat) 0.01 0.03   0.02 0.03  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.04 0.03   -0.05 0.03  
Racial ID. Importance -0.09 0.02 **  -0.10 0.02 *** 
Linked Fate -0.02 0.02   -0.03 0.02  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks -0.08 0.03 *  -0.06 0.03  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.09 0.03 **  0.07 0.03 * 
Age -0.02 0.03   -0.02 0.03  
Education -0.04 0.04   -0.05 0.03  
Income -0.02 0.03   -0.02 0.03  
Female -0.01 0.01   -0.01 0.01  
Experimental Condition 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01  
RPS Factor 1     0.02 0.03  
RPS Factor 2     0.13 0.03 *** 
     Constant 0.43 0.05 ***  0.44 0.05 *** 
N 465    465   
R-squared 0.20    0.21   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.8: Support for Corporal Punishment 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.20 0.06 **     
Authoritarianism 0.24 0.05 ***  0.25 0.05 *** 
Party ID (Democrat) -0.03 0.06   -0.05 0.06  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.13 0.06 *  -0.13 0.06 * 
Racial ID. Importance -0.07 0.05   -0.06 0.05  
Linked Fate 0.04 0.04   0.04 0.04  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks 0.11 0.07   0.07 0.07  
Stereotype Endorsement -0.14 0.07 *  -0.11 0.07  
Age -0.02 0.06   -0.03 0.06  
Education 0.00 0.07   0.01 0.07  
Income 0.07 0.05   0.06 0.05  
Female -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03  
Experimental Condition -0.07 0.03 *  -0.07 0.03 * 
RPS Factor 1     0.24 0.07 *** 
RPS Factor 2     -0.02 0.06  
     Constant 0.47 0.10 ***  0.45 0.10 *** 
N 471    471   
R-squared 0.13    0.14   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.9: Sympathy for Rioting Teens Arrested in Baltimore 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability -0.12 0.07      
Authoritarianism 0.01 0.06   0.02 0.06  
Party ID (Democrat) 0.11 0.07   0.09 0.07  
Ideology (Liberal) 0.13 0.06   0.13 0.06 * 
Racial ID. Importance 0.10 0.05   0.10 0.05 * 
Linked Fate 0.11 0.04 **  0.11 0.04 ** 
Discrimination toward 
Blacks 0.25 0.07 ***  0.23 0.07 ** 
Stereotype Endorsement 0.01 0.07   0.03 0.07  
Age -0.17 0.07 *  -0.18 0.07 * 
Education 0.16 0.08 *  0.17 0.08 * 
Income -0.03 0.06   -0.04 0.06  
Female -0.04 0.03   -0.05 0.03  
Experimental Condition -0.01 0.03   0.00 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     0.03 0.07  
RPS Factor 2     -0.14 0.06 * 
     Constant 0.13 0.10   0.11 0.10  
N 471    471   
R-squared 0.15    0.15   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Table 4.10: Support for the Death Penalty 
 
 Model 1: Full RPS  Model 2: RPS Factors 
 b se   b se  
Respectability 0.25 0.07 ***     
Authoritarianism 0.08 0.06   0.08 0.06  
Party ID (Democrat) -0.03 0.06   -0.03 0.06  
Ideology (Liberal) -0.03 0.06   -0.03 0.06  
Racial ID. Importance 0.05 0.05   0.05 0.05  
Linked Fate -0.02 0.04   -0.02 0.04  
Discrimination toward 
Blacks -0.02 0.07   -0.01 0.07  
Stereotype Endorsement 0.05 0.07   0.04 0.07  
Age 0.02 0.07   0.02 0.07  
Education 0.10 0.07   0.10 0.07  
Income 0.06 0.06   0.07 0.06  
Female -0.05 0.03   -0.05 0.03  
Experimental Condition 0.04 0.03   0.04 0.03  
RPS Factor 1     0.11 0.07  
RPS Factor 2     0.14 0.06 * 
     Constant 0.25 0.10 *  0.25 0.10 * 
N 470    470   
R-squared 0.08    0.08   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*Note: All variables scaled 0-1 for ease of interpretations. 
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Figure 4.1a 
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Figure 4.1b 
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Figure 4.1c 
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Figure 4.2a 
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Figure 4.2b 
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Figure 4.2c 
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Figure 4.3a 
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Figure 4.3b 
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Figure 4.3c 
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Figure 4.4a 
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Figure 4.4b 
 
 
  
  124 
Figure 4.4c 
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Figure 4.5a 
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Figure 4.5b 
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Figure 4.5c 
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Figure 4.6a 
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Figure 4.6b 
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Figure 4.6c 
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Survey Questions Used in Analyses 
 
1. How important is it for law enforcement to stop those who are loitering, trespassing, or 
engaged in disorderly conduct in public? 
m Extremely important 
m Very important 
m Moderately important 
m Slightly important 
m Not at all important 
 
2. In some states, local governments have passed city ordinances that fine people who wear 
sagging pants that show their underwear in public spaces. Do you favor, oppose, or neither 
favor nor oppose these fines? 
m Oppose a great deal 
m Oppose a moderate amount 
m Oppose a little 
m Neither favor nor oppose 
m Favor a little 
m Favor a moderate amount 
m Favor a great deal 
 
3. How important is it that welfare recipients be required to work or volunteer while receiving 
welfare benefits? 
m Not at all important 
m Slightly important 
m Moderately important 
m Very important 
m Extremely important 
 
4. In recent years, the U.S. military has debated whether it should ban some hairstyles, 
including braids, dreads, or certain natural hairstyles. How reasonable or unreasonable would 
such a ban be? 
m Extremely reasonable 
m Moderately reasonable 
m Slightly reasonable 
m Neither reasonable nor unreasonable 
m Slightly unreasonable 
m Moderately unreasonable 
m Extremely unreasonable 
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5. Please indicate how much you think each of the following contributes to the presence of 
gangs in American cities. [Randomize explanations] 
 A great deal A lot A moderate amount A little None at all 
Poor 
parenting m  m  m  m  m  
Lack of 
economic 
opportunity 
m  m  m  m  m  
Failing 
schools m  m  m  m  m  
Rap/Hip hop 
culture m  m  m  m  m  
 
6. Imagine that a woman in your community contracted a sexually transmitted disease after 
engaging in unprotected sex with multiple partners. How much help do you think the 
government should provide her in terms of healthcare services? 
m None at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
7. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose implementing harsher sentences for those 
found in possession of illegal drugs? 
m Oppose a great deal 
m Oppose a moderate amount 
m Oppose a little 
m Neither favor nor oppose 
m Favor a little 
m Favor a moderate amount 
m Favor a great deal 
 
8. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of 
murder? 
m Oppose a great deal 
m Oppose a moderate amount 
m Oppose a little 
m Neither favor nor oppose 
m Favor a little 
m Favor a moderate amount 
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m Favor a great deal 
 
9. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the use of corporal punishment in the 
home, for example, spanking? 
m Oppose a great deal 
m Oppose a moderate amount 
m Oppose a little 
m Neither favor nor oppose 
m Favor a little 
m Favor a moderate amount 
m Favor a great deal 
 
10. After a Black man died in police custody in Baltimore, Maryland, some teenagers were 
arrested for engaging in riot-like behavior.  
How much sympathy do you have for these teenagers who were arrested? 
m None 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
[Authoritarianism Items; 1 per page; Full sample receives these items; randomize within 
each pair] 
11. Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every 
person thinks that some are more important than others. In this section, we will show you 
pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell us which one you think is more important for a child to 
have. 
m Independence 
m Respect for elders 
 
12. Which one is more important for a child to have? 
m Curiosity 
m Good manners 
 
13. Which one is more important for a child to have? 
m Obedience 
m Self-reliance 
 
14. Which one is more important for a child to have? 
m Being considerate 
m Well-behaved 
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Identity Items 
15. How important is being Black or African-American to your identity? 
m Extremely important 
m Very important 
m Moderately important 
m Slightly important 
m Not at all important 
 
16. How much discrimination is there in the United States today against Blacks? 
m A great deal 
m A lot 
m A moderate amount 
m A little 
m None at all 
 
17. When you think about how Black people, as a group, are viewed by others, how often do you 
feel each of the following emotions? [Randomize order emotions presented in grid] 
 Never Sometimes About half the time 
Most of the 
time Always 
Pride m  m  m  m  m  
Irritation m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  
Shame m  m  m  m  m  
Excitement m  m  m  m  m  
Happiness m  m  m  m  m  
 
18. We are now going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people 
in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of '1' means that you think almost all of 
the people in that group tend to be 'hard-working.' A score of '7' means that you think most 
people in the group are 'lazy.' A score of '4' means that you think that most people in the 
group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in 
between. Where would you rate most Black people on this scale? [Horizontally scaled] 
m Hardworking 1 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 
m 6 
m Lazy 7 
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19. Where would you rate most Black people on this scale? [Horizontally scaled] 
m Non-violent 1 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 
m 6 
m Violent 7 
 
20. How important is religion to your life? 
m Extremely important 
m Very important 
m Moderately important 
m Slightly important 
m Not at all important 
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Experimental Scenarios *[Experimental Manipulation] 
 
At various points throughout the last year, Planned Parenthood [Black Lives Matter] protestors 
interrupted Democratic Party candidates and events to draw attention to their cause. At some 
events, they screamed loudly and pushed their way to the stage to make their case before large 
audiences.  
 
How appropriate do you think it was for Planned Parenthood [Black Lives Matter] protestors to 
engage in this kind of behavior as a way of advocating for their cause? 
 
m Extremely inappropriate 
m Moderately inappropriate 
m Slightly inappropriate 
m Neither appropriate nor inappropriate 
m Slightly appropriate 
m Moderately appropriate 
m Extremely appropriate 
 
Jack Pendleton [Demarcus Jacobs], a 25-year-old White [Black] man, was recently featured on 
the local news for his involvement in a string of robberies in a wealthy neighborhood in a 
Midwestern city. Because he is a repeat offender, local prosecutors are attempting to charge him 
with violating the state's "three strikes law." If convicted under the three strikes law, he could 
face life imprisonment for his crime.  
 
How reasonable or unreasonable would this sentence be? 
 
m Extremely reasonable 
m Moderately reasonable 
m Slightly reasonable 
m Neither reasonable nor unreasonable 
m Slightly unreasonable 
m Moderately unreasonable 
m Extremely unreasonable 
 
According to a new study from a non-partisan watch group, White [Black] Americans are 
slightly more likely than members of other racial groups to use drugs while receiving welfare 
benefits.  
 
How important is it that welfare recipients be drug tested as a condition of receiving welfare 
benefits? 
 
m Not at all important 
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m Slightly important 
m Moderately important 
m Very important 
m Extremely important 
 
How important is it for schools to insist that students use “proper English,” instead of Spanish or 
some other native language [Ebonics or Black English] while communicating with others? 
 
m Not at all important 
m Slightly important 
m Moderately important 
m Very important 
m Extremely important 
 
Templeton High, a predominantly Hispanic [Black] school, recently implemented strict dress 
code policies for their students to follow.  
 
How reasonable or unreasonable are these kinds of dress code policies? 
 
m Extremely reasonable 
m Moderately reasonable 
m Slightly reasonable 
m Neither reasonable nor unreasonable 
m Slightly unreasonable 
m Moderately unreasonable 
m Extremely unreasonable 
 
While on his way to work, Connor Kennedy [Jamal Williams], a White [Black] construction 
worker, was stopped by a police officer who said he had been driving too quickly in a school 
zone. Connor denied that he had been driving too quickly and argued loudly with the officer 
about the ticket. The officer told Connor to calm down, as he would have a chance to make his 
case in court. He refused, cursed at the officer, and was arrested for disorderly conduct.  
 
How appropriate do you think it was for the officer to arrest Connor? 
m Extremely inappropriate 
m Moderately inappropriate 
m Slightly inappropriate 
m Neither appropriate nor inappropriate 
m Slightly appropriate 
m Moderately appropriate 
m Extremely appropriate 
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Chapter 5:  
A Disruption in the Theater: Unpacking the Mechanisms of In-Group Punishment  
 
At the core of the current project is a concern with understanding what motivates 
individuals to punish those in their social group who are thought to confirm negative stereotypes 
about the group or who otherwise violate dominant social norms. Though the theorizing and 
evidence up to this point suggest that both esteem-based and instrumental considerations are at 
work in motivating in-group punishment, questions remain regarding the primacy of each set of 
considerations. On the one hand, individuals may be motivated to punish in-group members 
whose behavior threatens their sense of self and evokes negative social emotions like shame and 
embarrassment. This motivation, which we may regard as psychic or symbolic in nature, is 
consistent with a view of identity that centers on group membership as a core feature of the self-
concept. From this vantage point, policing and punishing bad in-group behavior can be viewed as 
regulatory, in the sense that its social function is to relieve the experience of negative group-
based emotions that may arise as a consequence of the group member’s behavior. This is, for 
many scholars of identity, the dominant perspective from which to think about group 
identification—a perspective that centers on ego and related constructs.  
In a society so deeply stratified by race, this purely ego-centric view of identity leaves 
much wanting, however, as it fails to fully appreciate the role of power and difference in 
affecting the lived experiences of those who exist at the margins of society. As I have argued 
previously, for these individuals, group identity does more than affect their sense of self in a 
given context; identity affects their lived experiences in varied and often disadvantageous ways 
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that have real consequences for their standing in the world. This reality, I should note, is not lost 
on the stigmatized. Among members of stigmatized groups, there is a keen and sophisticated 
understanding of America’s unequal social hierarchy and, as some of the results of this chapter 
will show, an equally rich understanding of the often-indiscriminate meting out of consequences 
by the dominant group. Stated differently, members of stigmatized groups understand that the 
dominant group wields an unequal amount of societal power and has at its disposal the ability to 
exact punishment on the whole based on the inferences they draw from the actions of a few. We 
recognize this understanding, for instance, in respondents’ answers to questions regarding the 
connection between group members’ behavior and the treatment of their racial group.  
To be sure, these instrumental considerations are likely related to their more affective 
counterparts, but they are not dependent on them. One’s concern about the potential costs of bad 
behavior for the group, and by extension the self, does not require that one feel ashamed or 
angered by the transgressions of the in-group member, but simply that one recognizes that there 
is some possibility that the in-group member’s transgressions will create challenges for others 
who belong to the group. In-group punishment, therefore, may emanate not primarily from a 
desire to save face, but from a more primary desire to avoid the real, tangible costs that may 
result from the transgressions of similar others. Insofar as we think these motivations—
instrumental and affective—represent competing or complementary explanations for in-group 
punishment, we should continue to examine closely where the strength of the evidence lies. That 
is the goal of this current chapter. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data presented in this chapter come from a study I conducted using Amazon’s 
TurkPrime platform. As described previously, TurkPrime allows researchers to target individuals 
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based on particular demographic characteristics. Using the service, I recruited a target sample of 
308 respondents. Respondents were told that the study’s aim was “to better understand how 
individuals respond to various social experiences and situations.” They were then instructed to 
read a scenario before being presented with a series of questions related to the scenario. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, in which the race of those 
engaged in bad behavior was manipulated. The text of the scenario, with manipulations 
highlighted in brackets, is below: 
Imagine you are in the following situation. 
 
It’s Friday night. You are eager to see a movie that happens to be showing at a small 
theater in a mostly White suburb about 25 minutes away from your home. Ten minutes 
after the movie has started, a crowd of [Black / White / no race mentioned] teenagers 
arrives, creating a disturbance that is so distracting everyone turns their attention to them. 
Even with all the attention they’re getting from other patrons, the group of [Black / White 
/ no race mentioned] teenagers continues talking and laughing loudly throughout the film. 
Members of the audience shake their heads and whisper to one another about what has 
occurred.  
 
After reading the scenario, respondents were then asked a series of questions to gauge 
their emotional reaction to the teenagers’ behaviors as well as their sense that the teenagers’ 
behavior would have negative consequences for people like the teenagers. Following these 
questions, respondents were asked to evaluate the appropriateness of two different punitive 
responses to the teenagers’ behavior. In particular, respondents were asked to evaluate how fair it 
would be for theater personnel to ask the teenagers to leave the theater and, separately, how 
appropriate it would be for personnel to call the police on the teenagers if the disturbance 
continued into the parking lot. Exploiting this design, we are able to explore whether and, if so, 
to what extent these affective and instrumental considerations affect punitive attitudes when the 
teenagers are described as Black (in-group condition) versus when the teenagers are described as 
White or when no race is mentioned (out-group conditions).  
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Though the study includes an experimental manipulation of the teenagers’ race, the 
results presented will only be able to demonstrate whether there is a significant correlation 
between these affective and instrumental considerations and the outcomes of interest. I do not 
manipulate these considerations in this study or anywhere else in the manuscript. The current set 
up is still useful, however, as it will allow us to place the affective and instrumental 
considerations in direct tension with one another. More than that, the design will allow us to 
examine another expectation that the motivations for in-group and out-group punishment are, at 
least in some contexts, different in kind. Theoretically, for example, feelings of shame and 
embarrassment can reasonably be expected to map onto variation in punitive attitudes when the 
in-group is implicated, but ought not matter much at all when out-group members are the target. 
Likewise, we should expect that instrumental considerations regarding the collective cost of bad 
behavior for the offender’s group ought to matter only when the group is inclusive of the self. 
Stated more plainly, there is little reason we should expect that one would care that some other 
group will have to bear some additional costs if a member or members of the group behaved 
poorly.  
Results 
 
Before delving into the questions about punishment, I want to briefly outline some of the 
descriptive findings that may provide some context as we discuss other findings from the study. 
To begin, let us consider the emotional responses participants had to the behavior of the 
teenagers in each condition. First, because the respondents are all Black and the disturbance in 
the theater may be regarded as stereotype-confirming behavior when engaged in by African-
Americans, I expected that respondents would report the greatest feelings of shame and 
embarrassment when the teenagers were described as Black. As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, this is 
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precisely what we observe. On average, respondents report significantly more shame and 
embarrassment when the teenagers are described as Black than they do when the teenagers are 
described as White or when no race is mentioned (p<.001). Conversely, respondents report 
significantly more anger when the teenagers are described as White than when the teenagers are 
described as Black (p<.001). When the race of the teenagers is not mentioned, the amount of 
anger reported is indistinguishable from both the Black teens and the White teens condition.32 Of 
note, shame and anger correlate at .4 in the Black teens condition, but have a much more modest 
correlation of .16 in the White teens condition. Though discrete emotions ought to be considered 
separately in our theorizing about the affective motivations of in-group punishment, anger may 
operate as a secondary and complementary emotion to shame, exacerbating or even overriding 
the effects of shame, an emotion we often regard as having withdrawal and avoidance 
tendencies.   
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 about here 
 
To capture individuals’ sense of a more instrumental collective threat, I asked 
respondents “Do you think the behavior of these teenagers will make it more difficult for people 
                                                        
32 The noisiness of the no-race condition will remain fairly consistent across analyses presented 
in this chapter. The no-race condition presents two challenges, which make the results pertaining 
to the condition more difficult to interpret. First, 30 percent of respondents in the no race 
condition failed to accurately recall how the teenagers were described, meaning that they recalled 
that the teenagers had been described using a racial descriptor, even though they had not. Of 
those who misremembered how the no-race teens were described, 23 of the 30 percent recalled 
that they were described as White. Four percent recalled that they were described as Black and 2 
percent responded that the teens had been described as Hispanic. Seventy-three respondents in 
the no-race condition (70 percent) did accurately recall that no race had been mentioned. For 
these respondents, a different challenge emerges. When these respondents are not told the race of 
the teenagers, they likely construct some image of them in their mind, and I have no way of 
knowing in this data what that image looks like for these respondents. Instead of throwing away 
data, I encourage the reader to interpret findings in the no-race condition cautiously. 
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like them to be welcomed into the theater in the future?” Respondents who answered “Yes” were 
then asked “How much more difficult?” Responses were then recoded on a standardized 5-point 
scale from 0-1, with 0 indicating a “No” response to the initial question and 1 indicating that a 
respondent answered “Yes” to the initial question and “A great deal” to the branching question. 
Here, again, I expect that, on average, respondents in the Black teens condition will perceive that 
people like the teenagers they read about (i.e. Black people) will face more difficulty being 
welcomed into the theater in the future than those in the White teens condition who likely expect 
that people like the teens they read about (i.e. White people) will face little difficulty based on 
the behavior of the White teens. For reasons described in the footnote on the previous page, our 
predictions regarding the no race condition are less certain. As the plot of means displayed in 
Figure 5.3 shows, the expectation regarding perceived costs in the Black and White teens 
condition is borne out in the data. The average respondent in the White teens condition believed 
that it would be “a little” more difficult for people like the teens to be welcomed into the theater 
in the future, though respondents in the Black teens condition believed it would be moderately 
more difficult for people like the Black teens to be welcomed into the theater in the future, with 
mean responses of .37 and .53, respectively—a difference of .16 percentage points. Again, we do 
not observe a significant difference between responses in the no race condition, relative to the 
Black teens condition. 
 
Figure 5.3 about here 
 
These descriptive findings are interesting, as they demonstrate the different affective 
responses to bad behavior from the in-group relative to the out-group and showcase the different 
perceptions of costs as they relate to the behavior of Black and White individuals. Beyond these 
findings, however, we are interested in whether emotional responses or instrumental 
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considerations correspond with punitive attitudes in this context and, if so, whether the 
motivations differ when one’s own identity group is implicated in the offense. Here, I analyze 
the results of two separate regression models. In the first model, I consider respondents’ beliefs 
about how fair it would be for theater personnel to ask the teenagers to leave the theater. I regress 
on this outcome, escortout, a set of demographic variables (age, education, income, 
and gender), a set of emotions items (anger, fear, and shame), and the measure of 
perceived costs to people like the teens, difficulty. Because I expect that the relationship 
between emotions and perceived costs may vary by condition, I interact each of the emotions and 
difficulty with an indicator variable, condition, where being in the Black teens 
condition is the omitted category. I then estimate the same model to examine respondents’ views 
regarding the appropriateness of calling the police on the teenagers if they continue causing a 
disruption outside the movie theater (callpolice). 
Focusing first on perceived fairness of escorting the teens from the theater, we observe a 
direct relationship between anger and the punishment. Those who think they would feel more 
anger in response to the teenagers’ behavior are more likely to think it fair to ask the teenagers to 
leave the theater. This relationship is not moderated by condition, meaning anger’s 
correspondence with this outcome is not dependent on the race of the teens creating the 
disturbance. Consistent with an in-group favoritism story, we also observe a main effect wherein 
respondents are slightly more lenient toward Black teens than they are toward White teens. 
Regarding the key covariates, we do not find support for the expectation that feelings of shame 
or embarrassment correspond with a willingness to have the teens removed from the theater, 
even when the teenagers are described as in-group members.   
Table 5.1 about here 
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We do find, however, a strong and significant relationship between perceptions of costs 
for people like the teens and this punitive outcome of removing the teens from the theater. 
Importantly, and consistent with theoretical expectations, this relationship maintains only in the 
condition where the teenagers are described as Black. Here, respondents who believe that the 
Black teenagers (in-group members) are behaving in a way that will make it more difficult for 
people like them (i.e. Black people) to be welcomed into the theater in the future are significantly 
more likely to respond that removing the Black teenagers is fair. This consideration of costs to 
people like the teenagers does not meaningfully predict differences in punishment when the 
teenagers are described as White or when no race is mentioned. 
Figure 5.4 about here 
When we consider respondents’ views about the appropriateness of calling the police on 
the teenagers, we observe again that these Black respondents find it more appropriate to call the 
police on the teenagers when the teenagers are described as White (p<.001). There is no 
significant relationship between any of the emotions and responses to this question. As in the 
previous case, feelings of shame do not correspond with attitudes toward this punitive outcome. 
Again, however, perceptions of cost to the group appear to only distinguish attitudes regarding 
punitiveness when the teenagers are described as Black, though this relationship in the Black 
teens condition fails to reach statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level, as 
displayed in Figure 5.5 (p=.07).  
As a final note, I want to draw the reader’s attention to a comparison between Black 
respondents’ feelings regarding the appropriateness of calling the police on members of their 
own group (i.e. the Black teens) relative to their feelings regarding the appropriateness of the 
police being called on out-group members. Again, an in-group favoritism story expects that these 
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respondents should be more willing to punish those outside the group. As I report previously, 
that is what we find. That in-group favoritism goes away, however, when individuals believe that 
the in-group member is behaving in a way that is costly to the group. Look again at Figure 5.5. 
Here, we observe that respondents who believe that the Black teenagers’ behavior has high costs 
for the group are as supportive of having the police called on the Black teenagers as they are on 
the White teenagers. Those Blacks who view the Black teenagers’ behavior as having little costs 
for the group behave as the vast literature on group identity and group favoritism expects.  
Table 5.2 about here 
Figure 5.5 about here 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to put in contention with one another emotional motivations 
for in-group punishment and more instrumental considerations pertaining to the perceived cost of 
bad behavior for one’s in-group. The study presented here is a simple one. Respondents are told 
to imagine that a group of teenagers is causing a disruption in a movie theater in a mostly White 
suburb about 25 minutes away from respondents’ home. The teenagers are described as either 
Black, White, or simply as teenagers, with no race mentioned. Respondents are then given an 
opportunity to express their views regarding two different punitive outcomes. In neither case do 
we find any evidence that feelings of shame or embarrassment correspond with punitive 
attitudes, even when members of the in-group are responsible for the offense. Anger appears to 
be the chief emotion at play, particularly in structuring responses to the question of whether it 
would be fair to ask the teenagers to leave the theater. This finding makes sense, as the teenagers, 
regardless of their racial identification, are interrupting a film that the respondent has driven 25 
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minutes to see. Those more angered by the disturbance ought to be more willing to send the 
teenagers packing, and they are. 
Arguably, the most important finding of this chapter is the strong relationship we observe 
between perceptions of cost to the people like the teenagers and respondents’ support for having 
the Black teenagers removed from the theater. Again, this finding is unique to the Black 
teenagers condition, providing strong evidence that perceptions of collective costs correspond 
with individuals’ willingness to punish in-group members. Though this finding is weaker when 
respondents are asked about the more severe (and seemingly extreme) punishment of calling the 
police on the teenagers if their disruption continues into the parking lot, what is striking is that 
the pattern maintains, even in these times when the Black community’s relationship with law 
enforcement is particularly tense. Moreover, the findings here help further elucidate the ways in 
which these instrumental considerations may lead to a breakdown in in-group favoritism and in-
group solidarity. For those of us who study or are interested in the politics of stigmatized groups, 
this is an important finding, as it highlights the role that these considerations may play in 
affecting punishment and other outcomes that implicate in-group members. Specific to the work 
of this dissertation, the results of this study suggest that instrumental concerns—those captured 
by Factor 2 of the RPS—may feature more centrally in Blacks’ thinking about respectability than 
concerns related to esteem and other more emotional constructs.33  
To be sure, this study is not without its weaknesses. There is, as I note previously, some 
noisiness with respect to the no race condition, though that noisiness should not detract from the 
                                                        
33In attempting to tease these esteem-based and instrumental considerations apart, I want to be 
cautious, as I do not intend to suggest that these considerations are fully separable. For members 
of stigmatized groups, in particular, esteem is bound up with all sorts of instrumental, status-
based considerations.   
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findings that emerge in the other two conditions where the race of the teenagers is made known 
to the respondents. More important than that, this study does not manipulate the affective or 
instrumental considerations, leaving us with a set of correlational findings that emerge from a 
multivariate regression. Building on the results of this study, it will be important to design a 
follow up study that attempts to prime the affective and emotional considerations before asking 
respondents to render a punitive judgment about in-group members engaged in negative, 
stereotype-confirming behavior. Such a design will allow me to make a stronger argument about 
the existence of a causal link between affective and instrumental considerations and punitive 
outcomes pertaining to the in-group, or a lack thereof. Future iterations of the experiment will 
also manipulate the audience that witnesses the behavior in an attempt to understand more 
clearly the conditionality of the concerns that respectability engender. If, for example, I find that 
Blacks more harshly punish in-group members who engage in bad behavior in view of Whites, 
this would represent further evidence that group members, in structuring their attitudes about 
punishment, incorporate into their judgments considerations about how this behavior is viewed 
by members of the dominant group. 
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Chapter 5 Tables and Figures 
Figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.3 
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Table 5.1: Fairness of Asking Disruptive Teenagers to Leave Theater 
 
 b se  
Condition    
White Teens 0.31 0.08 *** 
No Race Teens 0.14 0.08  
Anger 0.42 0.09 *** 
Condition X Anger    
White Teens X Anger -0.16 0.12  
No Race Teens X Anger -0.03 0.11  
Shame -0.06 0.08  
Condition X Shame    
White Teens X Shame 0.00 0.12  
No Race Teens X Shame 0.11 0.11  
Fear -0.09 0.11  
Condition X Fear    
White Teens X Fear -0.07 0.15  
No Race Teens X Fear 0.09 0.15  
Perceived Costs for People like Teens 0.22 0.08 ** 
Condition X Perceived Costs    
White Teens X Perceived Costs -0.29 0.10 ** 
No Race Teens X Perceived Costs -0.22 0.11 * 
Age 0.05 0.06  
Education -0.05 0.07  
Income 0.08 0.06  
Female 0.03 0.03  
Constant 0.43 0.07 *** 
N 299   
R-squared 0.27   
    
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001    
*The Black teenagers condition is the excluded 
category    
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Figure 5.4 
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Table 5.2: Appropriateness of Calling Police on Teens if Disturbance Continues in Parking Lot 
 
 b se  
Condition    
White Teens 0.35 0.10 *** 
No Race Teens 0.19 0.10  
Anger 0.17 0.12  
Condition X Anger    
White Teens X Anger -0.08 0.16  
No Race Teens X Anger 0.03 0.15  
Shame -0.04 0.10  
Condition X Shame    
White Teens X Shame -0.04 0.15  
No Race Teens X Shame 0.07 0.15  
Fear 0.08 0.15  
Condition X Fear    
White Teens X Fear 0.03 0.19  
No Race Teens X Fear 0.19 0.19  
Perceived Costs for People like Teens 0.20 0.10  
Condition X Perceived Costs    
White Teens X Perceived Costs -0.26 0.13 * 
No Race Teens X Perceived Costs -0.22 0.14  
Age 0.27 0.08 *** 
Education -0.14 0.09  
Income 0.07 0.08  
Female -0.03 0.04  
Constant 0.33 0.09 *** 
N 299   
R-squared 0.18   
    
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
*The Black teenagers condition is the excluded category 
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Figure 5.5 
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Theater Study Instrument 
 
 
 
Start of Block: Intro 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study to better understand how individuals respond to 
various social experiences and situations. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary 
and all responses will remain anonymous.   
    
Please read all instructions carefully and respond as completely and honestly as you can.   
    
If you have questions or concerns following your completion of the study, please feel free to 
contact the principal investigator for this study, Hakeem Jefferson, at hakeemjj@umich.edu.   
    
If you are ready to begin, please click on the button below. 
 
 
Page Break  
 
 
On the next page, please read the scenario presented. You will be asked a few questions about 
the scenario after you have read it. 
 
End of Block: Intro 
 
Start of Block: Experimental Condition 
 
Black Teenagers Condition 
Imagine you are in the following situation.   
    
It's Friday night. You are eager to see a movie that happens to be showing at a small theater in a 
mostly White suburb about 25 minutes away from your home. Ten minutes after the movie has 
started, a crowd of Black teenagers arrives, creating a disturbance that is so distracting everyone 
turns their attention to them. Even with all the attention they're getting from other patrons, the 
group of Black teenagers continues talking and laughing loudly throughout the film. Members of 
the audience shake their heads and whisper to one another about what has occurred. 
 
White Teenagers Condition  
Imagine you are in the following situation.    
    
It's Friday night. You are eager to see a movie that happens to be showing at a small theater in a 
mostly White suburb about 25 minutes away from your home. Ten minutes after the movie has 
started, a crowd of White teenagers arrives, creating a disturbance that is so distracting everyone 
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turns their attention to them. Even with all the attention they're getting from other patrons, the 
group of White teenagers continues talking and laughing loudly throughout the film. Members of 
the audience shake their heads and whisper to one another about what has occurred. 
 
No’Race Teens Condition 
Imagine you are in the following situation.    
    
It's Friday night. You are eager to see a movie that happens to be showing at a small theater in a 
mostly White suburb about 25 minutes away from your home. Ten minutes after the movie has 
started, a crowd of teenagers arrives, creating a disturbance that is so distracting everyone turns 
their attention to them. Even with all the attention they're getting from other patrons, the group of 
teenagers continues talking and laughing loudly throughout the film. Members of the audience 
shake their heads and whisper to one another about what has occurred. 
 
 
End of Block: Experimental Condition 
 
Start of Block: Emotions 
 
If you found yourself in this situation, having witnessed the behavior of these teenagers, how 
embarrassed or ashamed would you feel? 
m Not at all embarrassed or ashamed  
m Slightly embarrassed or ashamed  
m Moderately embarrassed or ashamed  
m Very embarrassed or ashamed  
m Extremely embarrassed or ashamed  
 
 
Page Break  
How afraid would you feel? 
m Not at all afraid  
m Slightly afraid  
m Moderately afraid  
m Very afraid  
m Extremely afraid  
 
 
Page Break  
How proud would you feel? 
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m Not at all proud  
m Slightly proud  
m Moderately proud  
m Very proud  
m Extremely proud  
 
 
Page Break  
How angry would you feel? 
m Not at all angry  
m Slightly angry  
m Moderately angry  
m Very angry  
m Extremely angry  
 
 
Page Break  
Do you think the behavior of these teenagers will make it more difficult for people like them to 
be welcomed into the theater in the future? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
 
Page Break  
How much more difficult? 
m A great deal  
m A lot  
m A moderate amount  
m A little  
 
End of Block: Emotions 
 
Start of Block: Punishment 
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How fair would it be for theater personnel to ask the teenagers to leave the theater, given their 
behavior? 
m Not at all fair  
m Slightly fair  
m Moderately fair  
m Very fair  
m Extremely fair  
 
 
Page Break  
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If you were sitting near these teenagers in the theater, how likely is it that you would say 
something to them about their behavior? 
m Extremely likely  
m Moderately likely  
m Slightly likely  
m Neither likely nor unlikely  
m Slightly unlikely  
m Moderately unlikely  
m Extremely unlikely  
 
 
Page Break  
 
If these teenagers were to continue causing a disruption outside the movie theater, how 
appropriate would it be for theater personnel to call the police to intervene? 
m Extremely inappropriate  
m Moderately inappropriate  
m Slightly inappropriate  
m Neither appropriate nor inappropriate  
m Slightly appropriate  
m Moderately appropriate  
m Extremely appropriate  
 
End of Block: Punishment 
 
Start of Block: Manipulation Check 
 
 
Just to check, do you recall the race of the teenagers described in the scenario? 
m They were White  
m They were Black  
m They were Hispanic  
m They were Asian  
m No race was mentioned  
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End of Block: Manipulation Check 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
Before we conclude, we'd like to know a few things about you. 
 
 
How old are you? 
m Under 18  
m 18 - 24  
m 25 - 34  
m 35 - 44  
m 45 - 54  
m 55 - 64  
m 65 - 74  
m 75 - 84  
m 85 or older  
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
m Male  
m Female  
m Other  
m I prefer not to answer  
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What is your race? Check all that apply. 
▢ White  
▢ Black or African American  
▢ American Indian or Alaska Native  
▢ Asian  
▢ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
▢ Other  
 
 
 
Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
m Less than high school  
m High school graduate  
m Some college  
m 2 year degree  
m 4 year degree  
m Professional degree  
m Doctorate  
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What is the current annual income (in US dollars) of your household? 
m Less than $10,000  
m $10,000 - $19,999  
m $20,000 - $29,999  
m $30,000 - $39,999  
m $40,000 - $49,999  
m $50,000 - $59,999  
m $60,000 - $69,999  
m $70,000 - $79,999  
m $80,000 - $89,999  
m $90,000 - $99,999  
m $100,000 - $149,999  
m More than $150,000  
 
End of Block: Demographics 
 
Start of Block: Party ID 
 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what? 
m Democrat  
m Republican  
m Independent  
m Other party {Specify} ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
Would you call yourself a strong or not very strong Democrat? 
m Strong  
m Not very strong  
 
 
Page Break  
Would you call yourself a strong or not very strong Republican? 
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m Strong  
m Not very strong  
 
 
Page Break  
  
  164 
 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
m Closer to Republican  
m Neither  
m Closer to Democratic  
 
End of Block: Party ID 
 
Start of Block: Exit 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. If you have any comments you'd like to 
make, please leave them in the comment box below. Once you are finished, please click the 
button below to conclude and exit the study. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Exit 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have endeavored to center the attitudes of Black 
Americans in our conversation about race and the politics of punishment in the United States. 
Parting company with much of the existing literature that focuses on the role that out-group 
animus plays in motivating White support for racialized punitive social policies, this project 
concerns itself instead with understanding why, and under what conditions, Black Americans 
may choose to support measures that have adverse consequences for members of their own 
group. To answer this question, I turn to a construct familiar to those interested in examining 
Black life and Black culture—the politics of respectability. Long a part of our scholarly and 
cultural lexicon, respectability was first introduced as a means of describing a worldview 
concerned with upending systems of inequality by focusing on the behavior and comportment of 
the oppressed. Emphasizing values of thrift, temperance, politeness, and good manners, early 
advocates of respectability argued that if Blacks behaved better, it would be more difficult for 
Whites to justify treating them unequally.  
Connecting the historical treatment of respectability provided by Higginbotham’s 
pioneering work with insights from psychology and political science, I have attempted to take 
respectability seriously as a social scientific construct worthy of rigorous investigation. More 
than that, this project has sought to nuance our understanding of public opinion by investigating 
a set of considerations long absent from our thinking about the calculus of opinion formation 
among Blacks and those who belong to other stigmatized social groups. By focusing on the role 
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respectability plays in affecting Black Americans’ thinking about punitive social policies in the 
21st century, this project contributes significantly to our understanding of identity and the 
complex role it plays in affecting individuals’ judgments and decisions. But more than 
complicating our understanding of identity and its role in American politics, this work advances 
on-going conversations about race and punishment in the United States. In particular, it 
highlights the deficient nature of a pure coalition building approach to reform that focuses on the 
attitudes and predilections of the out-group while assuming sympathy and absolution from the 
in-group. In these concluding remarks, I want to highlight for the reader the main takeaways 
from the dissertation before finishing with some thoughts about next steps and future directions. 
 
Highlights from the Dissertation 
 
I began this work interested in two broad questions. First, I was interested in 
understanding how members of stigmatized groups navigate their stigmatized identity and how 
the particulars of that navigation affect their thinking about politics. Based on my reading of the 
extant literature, political scientists have paid too little attention to the question posed by 
DuBois’ imagined interlocutor in The Souls of Black Folk: “How does it feel to be a problem?” 
(Du Bois 1994, 1). Moreover, I was interested in understanding and unpacking Black attitudes 
toward punishment, particularly punishment that implicates members of their own social group. 
From a theoretical perspective, thinking about the politics of respectability made sense as a 
starting point for marrying these two interests. Situating this work alongside Higginbotham’s 
seminal text that introduces respectability into our scholarly lexicon, I note in Chapter 2 that the 
politics of respectability is rooted in a history of subjugation and White supremacy. That is, 
respectability is a manifestation of stigma and the unique set of considerations that stigma forces 
upon the stigmatized. Central to the argument is that “being a problem” or being a member of a 
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stigmatized group burdens one with concerns not immediately present for those who exist 
outside the bounds of stigma. For Black Americans, and surely for members of other stigmatized 
groups, one such concern pertains to the behavior of in-group members. And these concerns, as I 
describe them, are both psychic and instrumental in nature, and have the potential to affect 
individuals’ beliefs regarding punitive policies that may be viewed as protecting the image and 
status of an already precariously positioned group. 
First, building on the tenets of social identity theory, Chapter 2 outlines the psychic costs 
that a group member’s behavior may have for other members of the group. Because the self-
concept is bound up with one’s membership in salient social groups (H. Tajfel and Turner 1986), 
threats to the group’s image have implications for one’s own sense of self and may evoke 
negative social emotions like shame and embarrassment. Considered through this lens, 
respectability and a desire to punish transgressive, stereotype-confirming behavior may emerge 
out of a desire to save face—to maintain positive regard for the racial group, thus making it 
easier to maintain a positive sense of oneself. Though a costly endeavor, concerning oneself with 
the behavior of in-group members can be viewed as an emotion regulation strategy, with 
punishment serving as the most extreme consequence of an investment in protecting the image of 
the group. These ego-centric considerations, though central to the workings of social identity 
theory, are hardly considered in our examination of individuals’ politics. The discussion of these 
considerations in Chapter 2 make clear why this is an unfortunate oversight, particularly in the 
study of stigmatized social groups. 
Beyond considering the emotional substrates that may undergird respectability and the 
politics of punishment among Black Americans, Chapter 2 presents a framework for thinking 
about respectability and in-group punishment as responses to instrumental concerns regarding 
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the welfare of the group and its members. As members of a stigmatized group, Black Americans 
are not judged solely on the basis of their own behavior. Throughout the course of American 
history, Blacks have experienced the pain of an indiscriminate meting out of punishment, and 
negative stereotypes have been used to justify the poor treatment of group members. Bad 
behavior from within the social group is, therefore, not simply the responsibility and concern of 
the offending group member. It poses a collective threat to the group’s status—threatening to 
confirm in the minds of Whites negative beliefs they have about Blacks, which has the potential 
to make life more difficult for the whole. These instrumental concerns about the way that bad 
behavior affects the status of the group are highlighted in seminal work in comparative politics, 
perhaps most famously in Fearon and Laitin’s work on inter-ethnic cooperation (1996), but to 
date have yet to be investigated carefully in the study of American politics. Consistent with a 
view of respectability as a conscious political strategy that seeks to undo a system of oppression, 
the framework presented takes these instrumental concerns seriously as potential drivers of 
punishment among in-group members.  
 Chapter 3 introduces the measure of respectability (the Respectability Politics Scale) that 
forms the basis for the analyses carried out in the remainder of the manuscript. In this chapter, I 
walk the reader through my efforts to develop a valid measure of respectability, highlighting the 
importance of constructing an instrument that allows us to answer both first and second-order 
questions related to the concept. Though this work is chiefly interested with understanding 
respectability as a determinant of Black attitudes, there is much that we do not know about the 
basic properties of respectability qua respectability. Focusing both on the 5-item measure of the 
RPS and its two separate factors, we observe in Chapter 3 that respectability appears to be more 
than some fringe belief set among Blacks. Instead, there appears to be much agreement among 
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members of the group that Blacks ought to behave well in public and carry themselves in ways 
that others will respect. And to a lesser degree, but still at levels that may surprise some, many 
also agree with the notion that Blacks would fare better if members of the group behaved better. 
Beyond assessing the distribution of respectability, I also examined the demographic, social, and 
psychological predictors of the concept, providing the first analysis that provides insight into 
who embraces and rejects the politics of respectability.  
 Beyond a historical rendering of respectability that notes the role of subjugation in 
manifesting the politics of respectability more broadly, the analyses of Chapter 3 allow us to 
think even more carefully about the origins of respectability as it takes hold among individual 
members of the Black community. Though it is difficult, without long-run panel data, to pinpoint 
precisely the necessary or sufficient conditions that give rise to respectability, the findings of this 
chapter are instructive as we seek to understand the particular aspects of one’s socialization that 
might matter in structuring one’s views about respectability. We observe, for example, strong 
relationships between the Respectability Politics Scale and authoritarianism, religiosity, and 
group-based shame. 
 This measure of authoritarianism is a composite score of individuals’ responses to several 
questions that ask about the importance of various traits for children—pitting more authoritarian 
traits against ones that stress characteristics like independence and curiosity. Insofar as one’s 
weighing of authoritarian traits is a function of one’s own upbringing, we can imagine that the 
politics of respectability likewise reflects the teachings of one’s own parents or community 
members. Though no measure exists in the data that adequately proxies for the potential role of 
parental socialization, the tenets of respectability, like many of the beliefs that individuals hold, 
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are likely informed by their early experiences in the world, the beliefs of their parents, and the 
makeup of their social networks.  
 The relationship between religiosity and scores on the Respectability Politics Scale 
provides some suggestive evidence, at least, that this kind of broader socialization matters. 
Because the survey question only asks respondents how important religion is to one’s life, it is 
challenging to disentangle precisely what this relationship tells us about the roots of 
respectability in the lives of individual Black people. Two potential explanations emerge, 
however. It could be the case that more religious Blacks embrace respectability because the 
tenets of respectability more closely align with the doctrinal teachings of one’s faith. It could 
also be the case that the Black church acts as a particular kind of social organization that 
provides for its members a unique social experience that conservatizes individuals’ preferences 
and beliefs, making it more likely that one would come to embrace a worldview like 
respectability. Regardless of the particular mechanism at work, the empirical finding here 
suggests a need to consider further the role that indigenous institutions like the Black church and 
other civic organizations (e.g. fraternities and sororities; Jack and Jill, Inc., etc.) play in 
socializing some Black people toward the politics of respectability. A deeper engagement with 
the role of these indigenous institutions will likely prove fruitful as I think further about 
individual-level differences in the embrace of respectability.  
 And finally, it is important to consider how socialization affects individuals’ emotional 
responses to negative, stereotype-confirming behavior from within the group. As I note at other 
points in the dissertation, shame is a complex social emotion—it requires that one understands 
what the norms and expectations are and that one understands when such a norm has been 
violated. It is not inevitable, however, that individuals respond negatively to what some may 
  171 
regard as bad or stereotypic behavior. It is wholly reasonable that two Black people can observe 
the same behavior from an in-group member and have vastly different reactions. Variation in 
individuals’ responses to the question of how often they feel ashamed or embarrassed when they 
think about how the racial group is viewed by others suggests that this is in fact the case. Moving 
forward, it will be important to consider more directly what explains variation in these emotional 
responses. Insofar as these reactions are themselves a result of different experiences and 
socialization processes, we should explore the role that exposure to information about the 
distinctiveness of one’s racial group has on individuals’ beliefs about respectability. To the 
extent that various aspects of one’s own socialization conditions how one responds to stereotypic 
behavior, we should endeavor to understand more about the factors that make it more or less 
likely that one responds negatively when an in-group member engages in that kind of behavior. 
Again, it is likely that a range of experiences and various aspects of individuals’ social networks 
matter in shaping these reactions.   
On this point about the role of shame in affecting individuals’ views about respectability, 
I find support for both the role of emotions and instrumental considerations in structuring 
attitudes about respectability. Findings suggest, however, a need to further refine the measure, as 
the predictors of items related to the first factor (i.e. items about importance of good behavior in 
public) lead me to suspect that respondents were calling to mind different considerations than I 
anticipated in answering these questions. In particular, it appears that in thinking about those 
items, respondents were considering the unequal social landscape in which Blacks find 
themselves. My intention in developing this set of items was to capture concerns about image 
threat, but it appears, based on the data, that responses to these items were less about emotions, 
and more about an understanding that in a society stratified by race, the subordinate group has to 
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behave well, lest they face a set of negative consequences. I will return to this point in my final 
comments about future directions, but this is an iterative measurement process and there are 
more iterations of the scale to come.  
Chapter 4 of the dissertation puts respectability and the Respectability Politics Scale to 
the test. Included in models that control for standard concepts in the discipline like partisanship 
and ideology and concepts particular to the study of Black politics like linked fate and identity 
centrality, the RPS explains variance in the outcomes of interest above and beyond existing 
measures. On questions such as support for sagging pants ordinances, harsher drug sentencing, 
and stricter welfare policies, we observe that the RPS contributes uniquely to our understanding 
of Black attitudes on these questions. Importantly, these results hold even in the presence of 
authoritarianism, a close confound of respectability present in each model. Again, based on 
extensive analyses that pit the two factors of the RPS against one another, there is reason to 
believe that this second factor, which concerns itself more with the instrumental nature of 
respectability, is a more powerful force in affecting how Blacks come to think about in-group 
punishment. Moreover, the results from the experiment presented in the chapter that manipulates 
the race of the target group further suggests a need to refine either the measure of respectability 
or the expectations about how the concept itself should be understood as it relates to individuals’ 
judgments of those outside the group. 
I finish the dissertation with a study that examines more closely the considerations that 
are brought to bear in individuals’ judgments about the behavior of in-group members versus 
out-group members. This study, which I refer to as the Theater Study, manipulates the race of 
teenagers engaged in disruptive behavior in a movie theater with a mostly White audience. 
Findings from this study demonstrate that Black respondents experience more embarrassment 
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and shame when the teenagers are described as Black than when they are described as White, 
and that negative emotions correlate more highly when the teenagers are described as in-group 
members. Moreover, Black respondents also perceive that the Black teenagers’ behavior will 
have greater and more negative implications for their group than the White teenagers’ behavior 
will have for people like the White teenagers. Importantly, these instrumental concerns relate to 
Black respondents’ willingness to punish the Black teenagers, but are unrelated to their support 
for punishing the White teenagers. These findings are important, as they highlight once more the 
role that instrumental considerations play in affecting individuals’ willingness to punish in-group 
members. 
Where Do We Go from Here? 
 
 This dissertation represents the first step in understanding how Black Americans come to 
think about punishment that implicates members of their racial group. In thinking about next 
steps, I want to discuss first what I see as the important tasks that remain to move this work 
forward. Let me describe first the theoretical work that remains. Thus far, my argument about the 
roots of respectability and in-group policing are chiefly about avoiding negative emotions and 
about individuals’ concerns about the consequences bad behavior may have for the racial group. 
Though I allude to it at various points in the project, I do not think the work takes seriously 
enough the possibility that respectability reflects concerns about safety and security. Over the 
course of working on this dissertation, I have read several open-ended responses from study 
participants that focus on individuals’ concerns that a misstep from a group member may lead to 
the individual getting harmed by an agent of the state (e.g. the police) or by some White person 
who feels empowered to respond negatively to some seemingly innocuous behavior. As a 
theoretical quandary, it seems odd to think about this motivation—a concern for the in-group 
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member’s safety—as being related to support for punitive policies that, by design, lead to 
negative outcomes for the individual. There are, however, ways one may reconcile this apparent 
paradox. Perhaps those who embrace respectability and support punitive polices do so, at least in 
part, because they think these policies deter engagement in bad behavior that could lead to 
outcomes even worse than the ones these policies present. 
 Relatedly, it is clear that the measure of respectability needs to be refined and validated 
further. The current measure does correspond with a host of predictors that suggest that the 
measure is capturing something that is fairly close to respectability, but more work needs to be 
done to test different items that may more cleanly capture the construct. And though the RPS 
explains variation across a range of outcomes, the fact that it appears to work similarly for Black 
and non-Black targets in the experiment gives me some pause as I think about the validity of the 
full measure. I am more encouraged by the results using the second factor of the model that 
pertains to the instrumental arm of respectability, but I am not yet convinced that in-group 
punishment is unrelated to concerns about image threat, which appears to be poorly captured by 
the first three items of the RPS.  
 Beyond the measurement work that remains, however, the Theater Study shows great 
promise in providing a foundation for thinking about in-group punishment that accounts for the 
theoretical framework of respectability without relying so heavily on the measure of 
respectability, itself. In this study, I demonstrate that Black respondents who perceive that the 
behavior of the teenagers will have negative consequences for people like the teens—ostensibly 
people like the Black respondents—are more likely to support punishing the teenagers. On-going 
work focuses on priming the emotional and instrumental considerations examined in this study. 
Other experimental work in progress seeks to manipulate other features of the environment to 
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test the conditionality of in-group punishment. For example, if I find that Black respondents are 
more likely to punish in-group members when the behavior is witnessed by Whites relative to the 
case when the behavior is witnessed by other Blacks, this would provide additional evidence that 
the kinds of considerations highlighted in this dissertation matter for how Blacks come to think 
about in-group punishment. In Jewish culture, a Yiddish phrase, shonda for the goyim, 
characterizes the phenomenon of one being pained by having a member of the group engage in 
stereotype-consistent behavior that is witnessed by non-Jews. Moreover, based on the 
observational data that shows a strong relationship between perceptions of discrimination and an 
embrace of respectability, I am also interested in examining whether providing information about 
the status of the group is causally related to concerns about in-group behavior. That is, do we 
find strong causal evidence that an increased sense of discrimination or bias toward one’s group 
makes individuals more concerned about the behavior of their group and, thus, more likely to 
punish in-group members who violate some set of social norms? These sorts of experiments do 
not depend on the measure of respectability, but will go a long way in helping us better 
understand the conditions under which individuals are more or less likely to support punishing 
in-group members.  
 This work is exciting, not only because of what it can tell us about Black attitudes toward 
punitive social policies that bear on the lives of other Black people, but also because of the 
framework it provides for scholars interested in understanding similar processes within other 
stigmatized social groups. The theoretical arguments put forth in the dissertation can be used, for 
example, to help understand variation in Latino attitudes toward policies related to immigration. 
To what extent do some members of the group support restrictive immigration policies as a 
means of distancing themselves from or punishing those who threaten the image and status of 
  176 
Latinos already living in the United States? Likewise, do we observe similar processes among 
Muslim Americans who may be motivated to support harsh punishment for group members who 
engage in terroristic behavior for reasons that differ from those that structure the attitudes of non-
Muslims? We can wonder about how these processes manifest for a variety of social groups, 
including women and members of the LGBTQ community who may support policies that are 
seemingly bad for other members of the group. What this dissertation makes clear, however, is 
that future work on punishment must take seriously heterogeneity in opinion among members of 
the target group, while examining carefully the factors that may explain that heterogeneity. In 
taking up this task, future scholarship will add further nuance to our understanding of identity in 
American politics and will re-center in our conversations those too often treated as mere objects 
of some dominant groups’ disdain. 
To be sure, one may reasonably wonder whether those concerned with the consequences 
of punishment in the United States should concern themselves with the attitudes of those who 
belong to the group targeted by the punishment. Admittedly, this criticism has dogged me 
throughout the writing of this dissertation and will, in all likelihood, remain a part of my thinking 
as I continue to pursue this work. For scholars and advocates interested in reform, however, it is 
not enough to understand the attitudes of those who belong to dominant social groups. We must 
commit ourselves to understanding, too, the attitudes and predilections of those most affected by 
the very policies that sustain and manifest from America’s unequal social hierarchy. The 
scholarly efforts of this dissertation have been put forth in that spirit.     
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